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Abstract
We study the evolutionary robustness of strategies in infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma
games in which players make mistakes with a small probability and are patient. The evolutionary
process we consider is given by the replicator dynamics. We show that there are strategies with a
uniformly large basin of attraction independent of the size of the population. Moreover, we show
that those strategies forgive defections and, assuming that they are symmetric, they cooperate.
We provide partial efficiency results for asymmetric strategies.
1 Introduction
The theory of infinitely repeated games has been very influential in the social sciences showing
how repeated interaction can provide agents with incentives to overcome opportunistic behavior.
However, a usual criticism of this theory is that there may be a multiplicity of equilibria. While
cooperation can be supported in equilibrium when agents are sufficiently patient, there are also
equilibria with no cooperation. Moreover, a variety of different punishments can be used to support
cooperation.
To solve this multiplicity problem, we study what types of strategies will have a large basin of
attraction regardless of what other strategies are considered in the evolutionary dynamic. More
precisely, we study the replicator dynamic over arbitrary finite set of infinitely repeated strategies
in which the strategy makes a mistake with a small probability 1 − p in every round of the game.
We study which strategies have a non-vanishing basin of attraction with a uniform size regardless
of the set of strategies being considered in the population. We say that a strategy has a uniformly
large basin of attraction if it repels invasions of a given size for arbitrarily patient players and small
probability of errors and for any possible combination of alternative strategies (see definition 3 for
details).
We find that two well known strategies, "always defect" and "grim," do not have uniformly large
basins of attraction. Moreover, any strategy that does not forgive cannot have a uniformly large
basin either. The reason is that, as players become arbitrarily patient and the probability of errors
becomes small, unforgiving strategies lose in payoffs relative to strategies that forgive and the size
of the basins of attraction between these two strategies will favor the forgiving one. This is the case
even when the inefficiencies happen off the equilibrium path (as it is the case for grim).
Also, we show that symmetric strategies leading to inefficient payoffs (on or off the path) cannot
have uniformly large basins of attractions. We also provide some efficiency results for asymmetric
strategies. First, we show that there is a relationship between the size of the basin of attraction
and the frequency of cooperation. Second, we show that there is a relationship between the degree
of asymmetry of a strategy and its efficiency. Third, we show that strategies with a uniformly large
basin of attraction cannot have inefficient payoffs in all histories.
It could be the case that inefficient and unforgiving strategies do not have uniformly large basins
since actually there may be no strategies with that property! We prove that that is not the case by
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showing that the strategy "win-stay-lose-shift" has a uniformly large basin of attraction, provided a
sufficiently small probability of mistakes. As this strategy is efficient (and symmetric), we show that
the concept of uniformly large basins of attraction provides a (partial) solution to the long studied
problem of equilibrium selection in infinitely repeated games: only efficient equilibria survive for
patient players if we focus on symmetric strategies.
Note that we not only provide equilibrium selection at the level of payoffs but also at the level of
the type of strategies used to support those payoffs: the payoffs from mutual cooperation can only
be supported by strategies that do not involve asymptotically inefficient punishments. This provides
theoretical support to the claims of Axelrod [Ax], that successful strategies should be cooperative
and forgiving.
In addition, we prove that our results are robust to perturbation of the replicator dynamic
provided that it is still the case that the only growing strategies are those that perform better than
the average.
In our study of the replicator dynamics (and its perturbations) we develop tools that can be
used to analyze the basins of attractions outside of the particular case of infinitely repeated games.
In fact the results are based in a series of theorems about general replicator dynamics which can be
used to study the robustness of steady states for games in general.
An extensive previous literature has addressed the multiplicity problem in infinitely repeated
games. Part of this literature focuses on strategies of finite complexity with costs of complexity to
select a subset of equilibria (see Rubinstein [R], Abreu and Rubinstein [AR], Binmore and Samuelson
[BiS], Cooper [C] and Volij [V]). This literature finds that the selection varies with the equilibrium
concept being used and the type of cost of complexity. Another literature appealed to ideas of
evolutionary stability as a way to select equilibria and found that no strategy is evolutionary stable
in the infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma (Boyd and Lorberbaum [BL]). The reason is that for
any strategy there exists another strategy that differs only after events that are not reached by this
pair of strategies. As such, the payoff from both strategies is equal when playing with each other
and the original strategy cannot be an attractor of an evolutionary dynamic. Bendor and Swistak
[BeS] circumvent the problem of ties by weakening the stability concept and show that cooperative
and retaliatory strategies are the most robust to invasions.
In a different approach to ties, Boyd [B] introduced the idea of errors in decision making. If
there is a small probability of errors in every round, then all events in a game occur with positive
probability destroying the certainty of ties allowing for some strategies to be evolutionary stable.
However, as shown by Boyd [B] and Kim [Ki], many strategies that are sub-game perfect for a given
level of patience and errors can also be evolutionary stable.
Fudenberg and Maskin [FM2] (see also Fudenberg and Maskin [FM]) show that evolutionary
stability can have equilibrium selection implications if we ask that the size of invasions that the
strategy can repel to be uniformly large with respect to any alternative strategy and for large
discount factors and small probabilities of mistakes. They show that the only strategies with
this characteristic must be cooperative. There are three main differences with our results. First,
Fudenberg and Maskin [FM2] focus on strategies of finite complexity while we do not have that
restriction. Second, our robustness concept does not only consider the robustness to invasion by a
single alternative strategy but also robustness to invasion by any arbitrary combination of alternative
strategies. In other words, we also look at the size of the basin of attraction inside the simplex.
Third, our full efficiency result only applies to the case of symmetric strategies and we only provide
partial efficiency results for the general case. We want to point out that to prove efficiency we use
a similar approach to the one used in [FM2].
Our results also relate to Johnson, Levine and Pesendorfer [JLP], Volij [V] and Levine and
Pesendorfer [LP] who use stochastic stability (Kandori, Mailath and Rob [KMR] and Young [YP])
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to select equilibria in infinitely repeated games. As having large basin of attraction is a necessary
condition (but not sufficient) for stochastic stability, the present results could help characterize
strategies that are stochastically stable in any finite population.
There is a previous theoretical literature providing evolutionary support for the strategy win-
stay-lose-shift (see Nowak and Sigmund [NS] and Imhof, Fudenberg and Nowak [IFN]). This strategy
has received little support from experiments on infinitely repeated games (see Dal Bó and Fréchette
[DBF], Fudenberg, Rand and Dreber [FRD] and Dal Bó and Fréchette [DBF2]). We hope that new
experiments can be designed to test this strategy’s robustness to invasions when it is already highly
prevalent in the population.
Finally, our result linking the size of the basin of attraction and the frequency of cooperation
relates to other experimental evidence provided by Dal Bó and Fréchette [DBF]. They find that
the frequency of cooperation is increasing in the size of the basin of attraction of Grim versus the
strategy Always Defect.
The paper is organized as follows: In section 2 we introduce the infinite repeated prisoners’
dilemma with trembles. In section 3 we define the replicator dynamics in any dimension. In theorem
1 we give sufficient conditions for a vertex to have a large local basin of attraction independent of
the dimension of the payoff matrix. More precisely, the conditions give a lower bound for the size
of the basin of attraction. Those conditions are based on comparing simultaneously the dynamics
associated to group of three vertices. Moreover, in subsection 3.4 we show that for a two dimensional
simplex, the conditions of theorem 1 with extra assumptions, also provide an upper bound for the
size of the basin of attraction. In particular, we show that to have a large basin of attraction is not
enough to analyze the dynamic of one dimensional simplex. In section 4 we recast the replicator
dynamics in the context of infinite repeated prisoners’ dilemma with trembles. We define the notion
of strategy having a uniformly large basin of attraction (see definition 3). In section 5 we show that
unforgiving strategies do not have a uniformly large basin (this includes the strategies always defect
and grim). In section 6 we prove that for any history, the frequency of cooperation converges to one
for symmetric strategies that have a uniformly large basin of attraction. In subsection 6.2 we obtain
an efficiency result for asymmetric strategies. First, we show that there is a relationship between
the frequency of cooperation of a strategy and the size of its basin of attraction. Second, we show
the frequency of cooperation after any history is bounded below by a quantity that is related to
how asymmetric the strategy involved is (the less asymmetric a strategy is, the higher the frequency
of cooperation). Third, we show that if there is a finite path such that the strategy does no fully
cooperate with itself for any sequel history, then the strategy does not have a uniformly large basin
of attraction (see theorem 7 and observe that this result requires considering populations of at least
three strategies). In section 7 we show how to adapt theorem 1 to the context of the set of all
the strategies. In particular, in subsection 7.1 we provide sufficient conditions to guarantee that a
strategy has a uniform large basin of attraction. As they follow from theorem 1, these conditions
basically consist of analyzing all the possible set of three strategies. Moreover, in subsection 7.2 we
show that weaker conditions that consist of comparing sets of two strategies are not enough to have
a uniformly large basin of attraction. In section 8 we develop a technique to calculate the payoff
with trembles for certain type of strategies (see definition 11) provided certain restriction on the
probability of mistakes (see lemma 16). In section 9 we apply this techniques for the particular case
of win-stay-lose-shift, proving that it has a uniformly large basin of attraction. We also consider in
subsection 9.1 a generalization of win-stay-lose-shift. In subsection 10 we show that theorem 1 also
holds for a general type of equation that resembles the replicator dynamics.
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2 Infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma with trembles
In the present section, we state the definitions of the game first without trembles and later with
trembles as in [FM2]. We explain how the payoff are calculated whit and without trembles.
In each period t = 0, 1, 2, ... the 2 agents play a symmetric stage game with action space A =
{C,D}. At each period t player one chooses action at ∈ A and player two chooses action bt ∈ A. We
denote the vector of actions until time t as at = (a
0, a1, . . . , at) for player one and bt = (b
0, b1, . . . , bt)
for player two. The payoff from the stage game at time t is given by utility function u(at, bt) :
A × A → ℜ for player one and u(bt, at) : A × A → ℜ for player two such that u(D,C) = T ,
u(C,C) = R, u(D,D) = P , u(C,D) = S, with T > R > P > S and 2R > T + S.
Agents observe previous actions and this knowledge is summarized by histories. When the game
begins we have the null history h0 = (a0, b0), afterwards ht = (at−1, bt−1) = ((a
0, b0), . . . (at−1, bt−1))
and Ht is the space of all possible t histories. Let H∞ be the set of all possible histories. A pure
strategy is a function s : ∪t>0Ht → A. In other words, a pure strategy s is a functions s : Ht → A
for all t.
It is important to remark, that given two strategies s1, s2 and a finite path ht = (at−1, bt−1), if
s1 encounter s2 then
ht = (s1(ht), s2(hˆt)),
where
hˆt := (bt−1, at−1). (1)
Given a pair of strategies (s1, s2) we denote the history that they as hs1,s2 . In other words, denoting
with hs1,s2t the path up to period t− 1 then the path hs1,s2 , is the path that verifies
s1(hs1,s2t) = a
t, s2(ĥs1,s2t) = b
t.
Given a pair of strategies s1, s2 the utility of the agent playing s1 is
U(s1, s2) = (1− δ)
∞∑
t=0
δtu(s1(hs1,s2t), s2(ĥs1,s2t)),
where the common and constant discount factor δ < 1.
Given a finite path ht, with hs1,s2/ht we denote the equilibrium path between s1 and s2 with
seed ht Given the recursivity of the discounted utility function we can write the utility starting from
history ht as U(s1, s2|ht) = (1− δ)
∞∑
k=t
δt−ku(s1(hs1,s2/htk), s2(
̂hs1,s2/htk)).
For the case of trembles, we have the probability of making a mistake, more precisely, with a
positive p < 1 we denote the probability that a strategy perform what intends. Now, given two
strategies s1, s2 (they can be the same strategy) we define
Uδ,p(s1, s2) = (1− δ)
∑
t>0,at ,bt
δtps1,s2(at, bt)u(a
t, bt)
where u(at, bt) denotes the usual payoff of the pair (at, bt) and ps1,s2(at, bt) denote the probability
that the strategies s1 and s2 go through the path ht = (at, bt) when they are playing one to each
other. To define ps1,s2(at, bt) we proceed inductively:
ps1,s2(at, bt) = ps1,s2(at−1, bt−1)p
it+jt(1− p)1−it+1−jt (2)
where
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(i) it = 1 if a
t = s1(ht), it = 0 otherwise,
(ii) jt = 1 if b
t = s2(hˆt−1), jt = 0 otherwise.
Therefore,
ps1,s2(at, bt) = p
mt+nt(1− p)2t+2−mt−nt
where
mt = Cardinal{0 6 i 6 t : s1(hi) = ai}
nt = Cardinal{0 6 i 6 t : s2(hˆi) = bi}.
Observe that if ht ∈ hs1,s2 (meaning that ht = hs1,s2t) then
ps1,s2(ht) = p
2t+2. (3)
With
Uδ,p,hs1,s2 (s1, s2)
we denote the utility only along the path hs1,s2 . With Uδ,p,hcs1,s2
(s1, s2) we denote the difference,
i.e., Uδ,p(s1, s2)− Uδ,p,hs1,s2 (s1, s2). Now, given a finite string ht with
Uδ,p(s1, s2/ht)
we denote the utility with seed ht and with
Uδ,p(hs1,s2/ht)
we denote the utility only along the path with seed ht for the pair s1, s2. In the same way, with
Uδ,p(h
c
s1,s2/ht
) we denote Uδ,p(s1, s2/ht) − Uδ,p(hs1,s2/ht). Also, with NE we denote the set of path
which are not hs1,s2−paths; usually those paths are called second order paths.
Definition 1. We say that s is a subgame perfect strategy if for any s′ different than s it follows
that
Uδ,p(s, s/ht)− Uδ,p(s′, s/ht) > 0.
It is also said that s is a strict subgame perfect strategy if Uδ,p(s, s/ht)− Uδ,p(s′, s/ht) > 0.
Let us consider two strategies s1 and s2 and let
Rs1,s2 := {h ∈ H0 : ∃ k > 0, s1(ht) = s2(ht) ∀ t < k; s1(hk) 6= s2(hk)}.
Observe that if s1(h0) 6= s2(h0) then any path h ∈ H∞ belongs to Rs1,s2 . In other words, we
consider all the paths where s1 and s2 differ at some moment, including the first move. Observe
that k depends on h, and it is defined as the first time that s1 differs with s2 along h, i.e.
kh(s1, s2) = min{t > 0 : s1(ht) 6= s2(ht)}.
From now on, to avoid notation we drop the dependence on the path, and with hk we denote the
k−finite truncation of h where k is the first time that s1 and s2 deviate along h. Observe that for
h ∈ Rs1,s2, the fact that s1(ht) = s2(ht) for any t < k does not imply that ht = s1(ht). Moreover,
observe also that if s1 6= s2 then
Rs1,s2 6= ∅.
From now on, given h ∈ Rs1,s2 with hk we denote the finite path contained in h such that s1(ht) =
s2(ht) for any t < k and s1(hk) 6= s2(hk)
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Lemma 1. It follows that
Uδ,p(s1, s1)− Uδ,p(s2, s1) =
∑
hk,h∈Rs1,s2
δkps1,s1(hk)(Uδ,p(s1, s1/hk)− Uδ,p(s2, s1/hk)). (4)
Proof. If s1(h0) 6= s2(h0) then Rs1,s2 = H0, hk = h0 and in this case there is nothing to prove. If
s1(0) = s2(0), the result follows from the next claim that states that given a history path h then
ps1,s1(ht) =
{
ps2,s1(ht) if t 6 k
ps2,s1(hk)ps2,s1/hk(σ
k(h)t−k) = ps1,s1(hk)ps2,s1/hk(σ
k(h)t−k) if t > k
(recall that σk(h) is a history path that verifies σk(h)j = hj+k). To prove the claim in the case that
t 6 k we proceed by induction: recalling (2)follows that
ps1,s1(at, bt) = ps1,s1(at−1, bt−1)p
i1t+j
1
t (1− p)2−i1t−j1t (5)
where
(i) i1t = 1 if at = s1(ht−1) = s1(at−1, bt−1), i
1
t = 0 otherwise,
(ii) j1t = 1 if bt = s1(hˆt−1) = s1(bt−1, at−1), j
1
t = 0 otherwise
and
ps2,s1(at, bt) = ps2,s1(at−1, bt−1)p
i2t+j
2
t (1− p)2−i2t−j2t (6)
where
(i) i2t = 1 if at = s2(ht−1) = s2(at−1, bt−1), i
2
t = 0 otherwise,
(ii) j2t = 1 if bt = s1(hˆt−1) = s1(bt−1, at−1), j
2
t = 0 otherwise.
Now, by induction follows that ps1,s1(at−1, bt−1) = ps2,s1(at−1, bt−1) and from s1(ht−1) = s2(ht−1)
follows that i1t = i
2
t , j
1
t = j
2
t .
Lemma 2. Given any pair of strategies s1, s2 it follows that
|Uδ,p(hcs2,s1/ht)| <
1− p2
p2(1− δ)M
where M = max{T, |S|}.
Proof. Observe that fixed t then ∑
ht∈Ht
ps1,s2(ht) = 1,
since in the equilibrium path at time t the probability is p2t+2 it follows that∑
ht /∈Ht∩NE
ps1,s2(ht) = 1− p2t+2.
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Therefore, and recalling that u(ht) 6 M,
|Uδ,p(hcs2,s1/ht)| = |
1− p2δ
p2
∑
t>0,ht /∈NE
δtps1,s2(ht)u(h
t)|
6 (1− δ)
∑
t>0
δt
∑
ht /∈NE
ps1,s2(ht)|u(ht)|
6 (1− δ)M
∑
t>0
δt(1− p2t+2)
= M [(1− δ)
∑
t>0
δt − (1− δ)
∑
t>0
δtp2t+2]
= M [1− p2 1− δ
1− p2δ ]
=
1− p2
(1− p2δ)M.
From previous lemma, we can conclude the next two lemmas:
Lemma 3. Given two strategies s1 and s2
lim
p→1
∑
ht∈NE
Uδ,p(s1, s2/ht) = 0.
Lemma 4. Given two strategies s1s2 then
limp→1Uδ,p(s2, s2)− Uδ,p(s1, s2) =
∑
hk,h∈Rs1,s2
δk[Uδ(hs2,s2/hk)− Uδ(hs1,s2/hk)].
Now, we are going to rewrite the equation (4) considering at the same time the paths h and hˆ.
The reason to do that it will become more clear in subsection 7.1.
Remark 1. Observe that given a strategy s if hˆt 6= ht it could hold that s(hˆt) 6= s(ht). Also,
given two strategies s1, s2 it also could hold that kh(s1, s2) 6= khˆ(s1, s2). However, it follows that if
kh(s1, s2) 6 khˆ(s1, s2) then
ps1,s1(hk) = ps1,s1(hˆk) = ps1,s2(hk) = ps1,s2(hˆk) =
ps2,s1(hk) = ps2,s1(hˆk) = ps2,s2(hk) = ps2,s2(hˆk)
Using previous remark, we define the set R∗s1,s2 as the set
R∗s1,s2 = {h ∈ Rs1,s2 : kh(s1, s2) 6 khˆ(s1, s2)}
and therefore the differences Uδ,p(s2, s2)−Uδ,p(s1, s2) can be written in the following way (denoting
k as kh(s1, s2))
Uδ,p(s2, s2)− Uδ,p(s1, s2) =∑
hk,h∈R∗s1,s2
δkps1,s1(hk)[Uδ,p(s1, s1/hk)− Uδ,p(s2, s1/hk) + Uδ,p(s1, s1/hˆk)− Uδ,p(s2, s1/hˆk)].
Now we are going to give a series of lemmas that relates equilibrium paths with seeds ht and hˆt;
later, we also relate the payoff along those paths. The proofs of the first two next lemmas are
obvious and left to the reader.
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Lemma 5. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path ht follows that
ĥs∗,s/ht = hs,s∗/hˆt (7)
Now, we try to relates the payoffs. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path hk, we take
b1 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hk)=R
δj , b2 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hk)=S
δj ,
b3 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hk)=T
δj , b4 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hk)=P
δj .
Observe that b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1 and
U(s∗, s) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P.
In the same way, for hˆk we define bˆ1, bˆ2, bˆ3, bˆ4
b1 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hˆk)=R
δj , b2 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hˆk)=S
δj ,
b3 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hˆk)=T
δj , b4 = (1− δ)
∑
j:uj(s∗,s/hˆk)=P
δj .
Observe that bˆ1 + bˆ2 + bˆ3 + bˆ4 = 1. Now we define
B1 = b1 + bˆ1, B2 = b2 + bˆ2, B3 = b3 + bˆ3, B4 = b4 + bˆ4.
Remark 2. The above numbers bj depend on δ and the infinite sums converge fixed δ. However,
they could not converge as δ goes to 1.
Lemma 6. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path hk, if
Uδ(hs∗,s/hk) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4PS
then
Uδ(hs,s∗/hˆk) = b1R+ b2T + b3S + b4P.
Moreover, if
Uδ(hs∗,s/hk) + Uδ(hs∗,s/hˆk) = B1R+B2T +B3S +B4P,
then
Uδ(hs,s∗/hk) + Uδ(hs,s∗/hˆk) = B1R+B2S +B3T +B4P.
Lemma 7. Given two strategies s, s∗ and a path hk, follows that
Uδ(hs,s∗/hk) + Uδ(hs∗,s/hˆk) 6 2R.
Lemma 8. For any λ0 < 1 follows that there exists λˆ0 < 1 such that if Uδ(hs,s/ht) = λ0R then
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/hˆt) 6 2λˆ0R.
Moreover, for any λ′0 < λ0 then λˆ
′
0 < λˆ0. In particular,
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/hˆt) < 2R.
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Proof. If Uδ(hs,s/ht) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P = λ0R then it follows that
max{b2, b3, b4} > 1− λ0
3
. (8)
In fact, if it is not the case,
b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P > b1R = (1− (b2 + b3 + b4)) > [1− (1− λ0)]R = λ0R,
a contradiction. From equality (7) follows U(hs,s/hˆt) = b1R+ b2T + b3S + b4P so
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/hˆt) = 2b1R+ (b2 + b3)(T + S) + 2b4P
and from the fact that b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1 follows that is equal to
2R− [2b2(R− P ) + (b3 + b4)(2R − (T + S))]
So taking
Rˆ = min{R− P,R− (T + S)
2
}
which is positive, follows from inequality (8) that
Uδ(hs,s/ht) + Uδ(hs,s/hˆt) < 2R− 2
1− λ0
3
Rˆ,
and taking
λˆ0 = 1− 1− λ0
3
Rˆ
R
the result follows.
From now one, given a pair of strategies s1 and s2 (s2 could be equal to s1) we use the following
notations,
Uδ,p(s1, s2/hk, hˆk) := Uδ,p(s1, s2/hk) + Uδ,p(s1, s2/hk),
Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hk,hˆk) := Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hk) + Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hˆk).
3 Replicator dynamics
In this section we introduce the notion of replicator dynamics and we analyze the attractors.
Given the payoff matrix
A =


a11 . . . a1i . . . a1n
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
ai1 . . . aii . . . ain
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
an1 . . . ani . . . ann


Let ∆ be the n−dimensional simplex
∆ = {(x1 . . . xn) ∈ Rn : x1 + · · · + xn = 1, xj > 0,∀j}.
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We consider the replicator dynamics X associated to the payoff matrix A on the n dimensional
simplex given by the equations:
x˙j = Xj(x) := xjFj(x) = xj(fj − f¯)(x) (9)
where
fj(x) = (Ax)j , f¯(x) =
n∑
l=1
xlfl(x),
where (AX)j denotes the j−th coordinate of the vector Ax. In other words, provided a payoff
matrix A, the replicator equation is given by
x˙j = xj[(Ax)j − xtAx], j = 1, . . . , n
where xt denotes the transpose vector.
Using that 1 = x1 + x2 + · · ·+ xn we can write
Fj = fj(x)(x1 +x2 + · · ·+ xn)− f¯(x) = fj(x)(x1 + x2 + · · ·+xn)−
∑
xlfl(x) =
∑
l 6=j
xl(fj − fl)(x).
We denote with ϕ the associated flow:
ϕ : R×∆→ ∆.
Giving t ∈ R with ϕt : ∆→ ∆ we denote the t− time diffeomorphism. Observe that any vertex is
a singularity of the replicator equation, therefore, any vertex is a fixed point of the flow.
3.1 Affine coordinates for the replicator equation
We consider an affine change of coordinates to define the dynamics in the positive quadrant of Rn−1
instead of the simplex ∆. The affine change of coordinates is given by
x¯1 = 1−
∑
j>2
xj, x¯j = xj ∀ j > 2
and so, the replicator equation is defined as
x˙j = Fj(x¯)xj , j = 2, . . . , n
where x¯ = (x¯1, x¯2 . . . , x¯n) with xi > 0, x2 + · · ·+ xn 6 1 and
Fj(x¯) = (fj − f¯)(1−
∑
i>2
xi, x2, . . . , xn).
Observe that in these coordinates the point e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0) corresponds to (0, . . . , 0) and in the
new coordinates the simplex ∆ is replaced by {(x2, . . . , xn) : xi > 0,
∑n
i=2 xi 6 1}.
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We also can rewrite Fj in the following way:
Fj(x¯) =
∑
l 6=j,l>1
(fj − fl)(x¯)x¯l
= (fj − f1)(x¯)(1 −
∑
l>2
xl) +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
(fj − fl)(x¯)x¯l
= (fj − f1)(x¯)(1 −
∑
l>2
xl) +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
(fj − fl)(x¯)xl
= (fj − f1)(x¯)−
∑
l>2
(fj − f1)(x¯)xl +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
(fj − fl)(x¯)xl
= (fj − f1)(x¯)− (fj − f1)(x¯)xj +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
[(fj − fl)(x¯)− (fj − f1)(x¯)]xl
= (fj − f1)(x¯)− (fj − f1)(x¯)xj +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
(f1 − fl)(x¯)xl
= (fj − f1)(x¯) + (f1 − fj)(x¯)xj +
∑
l 6=j,l>2
(f1 − fl)(x¯)xl
= (fj − f1)(x¯) +
∑
l>2
(f1 − fl)(x¯)xl.
Denoting
R(x¯) :=
∑
l>2
(f1 − fl)(x¯)xl, (10)
it follows that
Fj(x¯) = (fj − f1)(x¯) +R(x¯) (11)
where
(fj − fl)(x¯) =
∑
k>1
(ajk − alk)x¯k = (aj1 − al1)x¯1 +
∑
k>2
(ajk − alk)x¯k
= (aj1 − al1)(1−
∑
l>2
xl) +
∑
k>2
(ajk − alk)xk
= aj1 − al1 +
∑
k>2
(ajk − alk − aj1 + al1)xk.
Observe that if we take the matrix M ∈ R(n−1)×(n−1) and the vector N ∈ Rn−1 such that
Mjk = ajk − a1k + a11 − aj1
and
Nj = aj1 − a11
then the replicator equation on affine coordinates is given by
x˙j = xj[(v +Mx)j − xt(v +Mx)], j = 2, . . . , n; (12)
where (v +Mx)j is the j − th coordinate of v +Mx.
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3.2 Attracting fixed points
Given a point e and a positive constant ǫ, Bǫ(e) denotes the ball of radius ǫ and center e.
Definition 2. Attracting fixed point and local basin of attraction. Let e be a singular point
of X (i.e.: X(e) = 0). It is said that e is an attractor if there exists an open neighborhood U of
e such that for any x ∈ U follows that ϕt(x) → e. The global basin of attraction Bs(e) is the set
of points that its forward trajectories converges to e. Moreover, given ǫ > 0 we say that Bǫ(e) is
contained in the local basin of attraction of e if Bǫ(e) is contained in global basin of attraction and
any forward trajectory starting in Bǫ(e) remains inside Bǫ(e). This is denoted with Bǫ(e) ⊂ Bsloc(e).
For the sake of completeness, we give a folklore’s sufficient condition for the vertex e1 to be an
attractor. Before that, we need to calculate the derivative DX of the functionX = (X1 . . . Xn) given
by the replicator equation (see equation 9). For that, for any l, we compute DXl = (
∂Xl
∂x1
. . . ∂Xl∂xn )
and observe that for k 6= l then ∂Xl∂xk = (∂xkfl − ∂xk f¯)xk, and for k = l follows that
∂Xl
∂xl
=
(∂xlfl − ∂xl f¯)xl + fl − f¯ .
Lemma 9. If e1 is a strict Nash equilibrium (i.e. a11 − aj1 > 0 for any j 6= 1) then e1 is an
attractor. Moreover, the eigenvalues of DX at e1 are given by {a11 − aj1}j>1.
Proof. To prove the result, observe first that 0¯ (the point e1 in the simplex) is a fixed point. To
finish, observe that D0X is a diagonal matrix with {aj1 − a11}j 6=1 in the diagonal. Therefore,
{aj1 − a11}j 6=1 are the eigenvalues which by hypothesis are all negative.
3.3 Large Basin of attractions for fixed points
The goal of the following theorem is to give sufficient conditions for a vertex to have a “large
local basin of attraction”, independent of the dimension of the space. In other words, provided a
vertex e and a positive number K, the goal is to find sufficient condition for any payoff matrix A,
independently of the dimension, such that the neighborhood BR(e) is contained in the local basin
of attraction of e.
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A natural condition is to assume that the eigenvalues are “uniformly negative”. But this criterion
is not appropriate for the context of games, since the quantities aj1− a11 even when negative could
be arbitrary close to zero. However, we take advantage of the fact that the replicator equations are
given by a special type of cubic polynomials, and we provide a sufficient condition for “large local
basin of attraction” even for the case that the eigenvalues are close to zero. To do that, we need to
introduce some other quantities. From now on we use the L1−norm
||x|| =
∑
i>1
|xi|.
Now, let us go back to the replicator equations and let us assume from now on that e is a strict
Nash equilibrium, i.e.
a11 − aj1 > 0
for any j 6= 1. Recall as we define in the previous subsection the matrix M and N given by
Nj1 = aj1 − a11 (13)
Mij = aji − a1i + a11 − aj1 (14)
. Mji = aij − a1j + a11 − ai1. (15)
Moreover, we assume that the vertex {e2 . . . en} are ordered in such a way that
a11 − ai1 > a11 − aj1, ∀ 2 6 i < j.
Theorem 1. Let A ∈ Rn×n (n arbitrary) such that aj1 < a11. Let
M0 = max
i,j>i
{Mij +Mji−Ni , 0}. (16)
Then,
∆ 1
M0
= {x¯ :
∑
i>2
xi 6
1
M0
} ⊂ Bsloc(e1).
The proof of the theorem is based on a crucial lemma about quadratic polynomials (see lemma
10). So, first we recall a series of definitions and results involving quadric, we state the lemma,
provide its proof and latter we prove theorem 1.
First recall that a quadratic polynomial Q is a function from Rn to R of the form Q(x) =
Nx+xtMx (where N is a vector, M is a square matrix and xt means the transpose of x). It is said
that Q is positive-definite if xtMx > 0 for any x. It is said that Q is negative-definite if xtMx 6 0
for any x. Now, associated to a quadratic polynomial Q we consider the set
{x ∈ Rn : Q(x) = 0}
which is a smooth submanifold of codimension one. Observe that Q(0) = 0. If Q is either positive-
definite or negative-definite then {Q(x) = 0} is an ellipsoid, in particular, it is a connected compact
set and {x ∈ Rn : Q(x) 6 0} is a convex set (see first two cases in figure 2). If Q is neither
positive-definite nor negative-definite then {Q(x) = 0} is a hyperboloid, and in particular, it is not
a bounded set. However, it could be connected or not (see third case of figure 2).
13
Q(x)<0
p
 13
p
12
 
p
 13
p
Q(x)>0
 
Q(x)<0
12
Q(x)<0
p
 13
p
12
 
Figure 2: Q positive-definite, negative-definite and neither.
Lemma 10. Let Q : Rn → R given by
Q(x) = Nx+ xtMx
with x ∈ Rn, N ∈ Rn and M ∈ Rn×n. Let us assume that Ni < 0 for any i and for any j > i,
|Ni| > |Nj |. Let
M0 = max
i, j>i
{Mij +Mji−Ni , 0}.
Then, the set ∆ 1
M0
= {x ∈ Rn : xi > 0,
∑n
i=1 xi <
1
M0
} is contained in {x : Q(x) < 0}. In particular,
if M0 = 0 then
1
M0
is treated as ∞ and this means that {x ∈ Rn : xi > 0} ⊂ {x : Q(x) 6 0}.
Proof. For any v ∈ Rn such that vi > 0 and
∑
i vi = 1, we consider the following one dimensional
quadratic polynomial, Qv : R→ R given by
Qv(s) := Q(sv) = sNv + s2vtMv.
To prove the thesis of the lemma, we claim that is enough to show that
“for any positive vector v with norm equal to 1, if 0 < s <
1
M0
thenQv(s) < 0” ; (17)
in fact, to prove that claim, we can argue by contradiction: if there is a point x0 ∈ ∆ 1
M0
different
than zero (i.e.: 0 < |x0| < 1M0 ) such that Q(x0) = 0, then taking v = x0|x0| and s = |x0| follows that
Qv(s) = Nx0 + x
t
0Mx0 = 0, but |v| = 1, s < 1M0 , a contradiction.
Now we proceed to show (17). Observe that the roots of Qv(s) are given by s = 0 and
s =
−Nv
vtMv
.
Observe that
−Nv =
∑
(−Ni)vi > 0.
If vtMv < 0 then it follows that Qv is a one dimensional quadratic polynomial with negative
quadratic term and two non-positive roots, so for any s > 0 holds that Qv(s) < 0 and therefore
proving the claim in this case. So, it remains to consider the case that vtMv > 0. In this case,
since Qv is a one dimensional quadratic polynomial with positive quadratic term (vtMv), therefore
for any s between both roots (0, −NvvtMv ) follows that Q < 0 so to finish we have to prove that
−Nv
vtMv
>
1
M0
. (18)
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Using that
∑
j>i vj 6 1 observe
vtMv =
∑
ij
vivjMij
=
∑
i
[v2iMii +
∑
j>i
vivj(Mij +Mji)]
6
∑
i
[v2i (−Ni)M0 +
∑
j>i
vivj(−Ni)M0] =
= M0
∑
i
(−Ni)vi[
∑
j>i
vj]
6 M0
∑
i
(−Ni)vi
= M0(−Nv).
Therefore, (18) holds and so proving (17).
Now we provide the proof of theorem 1.
Proof of theorem 1: We consider the affine change of coordinates: x¯1 = 1 −
∑
j>2 xj , x¯j = xj , j =
2, . . . , n introduced before. Let X = (X2, . . . ,Xn) the vector field in these coordinates, where
Xj = x¯jFj(x¯). For any k < 1 we denote
∆k := {x¯ :
∑
i>2
xi 6 k}, ∂∆k = {x¯ :
∑
i>2
xi = k}.
We want to show that for any initial condition x¯ in the region ∆ 1
M0
follows that the map
t→ x¯(t) =
∑
i>2
x¯k(t)
is a strict decreasing function and so the trajectories remains inside ∆ 1
M0
and since it can not escape
∆ it follows that x¯(t) → 0 and therefore the trajectory converge to (0, . . . , 0). To do that, we prove
˙¯x < 0.
Therefore, we have to show
Q(x¯) := ˙¯x =
∑
j>2
Xj =
∑
j>2
xjFj(x¯) < 0. (19)
Recall that Fj = (fj − f1)(x¯) + R(x¯) where R(x¯) =
∑
l>2 (f1 − fl)(x¯)xl (see equations (10) and
(11)). Therefore,
Q(x¯) =
∑
j>2
(fj − f1)(x¯)xj +
∑
j>2
R(x¯)xj
=
∑
j>2
(fj − f1)(x¯)xj +R(x¯)
∑
j>2
xj.
Since
∑
j>2 xj = k (with k < 1) follows that
Q(x¯) =
∑
j>2
(fj − f1)(x¯)xj +R(x¯)k.
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Recalling the expression of R we get that
Q(x¯) = (1− k)
∑
j>2
(fj − f1)(x¯)xj .
So, to prove inequality (19) is enough to show that
Q(x¯) = (1− k)
∑
j
xj(fj − f1)(x¯) < 0 ∀ x¯ ∈ ∆k, k < 1
M0
.
First we rewrite Q. Observe that
(fj − f1)(x¯) =
∑
i
(aji − a1i)x¯i =
= aj1 − a11 +
∑
i>2
(aji − a1i + a11 − aj1)xi.
If we note the vector
N := (aj1 − a11)j
and the matrix
M := (Mij) = aji − a1i + a11 − aj1.
Therefore,
Q(x¯) = Nx¯+ x¯tMx¯.
So we have to find the region given by {x¯ : Q(x¯) = 0}. To deal with it, we apply lemma 10 and we
use equation (16) and the theorem is concluded.
Remark 3. Observe that in the theorem 10 it only matters to compare a11 − ai1 with the entries
Mij +Mji that are positive.
Remark 4. If we apply the proof of lemma 10 to the particular case that v = ej , we are considering
the map
Qv(s) = s[aj1 − a11 + (ajj − a1j + a11 − aj1) s]
and Q(s) = 0 if and only if s = 0 or
s =
a11 − aj1
a11 − aj1 + ajj − a1j =
1
1 +
ajj−a1j
a11−aj1
= p1j (20)
and so
Q(s) < 0, ∀ 0 < s < p1j .
In particular, if we apply this to theorem 10, it follows that the whole segment [0, p1j) is in the basin
of attraction of e1. In particular, observe that pˆ1j = (1 − p1j, . . . , p1j . . . ), is the unique fixed point
of the replicator dynamics in the interior of the one dimensional simplex that contains e1, ej .
Remark 5. Observe that the basin of attraction could be much larger than the region given by the
previous theorem. It may be the case that better linear upper bounds for the quadratics map Fj could
provide better estimates for the size of the basin of attraction.
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3.4 Comparing strategies by pairs is not enough
In this section we show that to guarantee that a strategy has a uniformly large basin of attraction
is not enough to compare it with every other single strategy one at the time. In other words is not
enough to bound by below the basin of attraction of only considering populations of two strategies.
More precisely, we provide a set of conditions for a population of three strategies where only one
is an attractor (and therefore its basin is large in each one dimensional simplex) but it has a small
local basin.
We consider a replicator dynamics in dimension two and we write the equation in affine coordi-
nates {(x1, x2) : 0 > x2 6 1, 0 > x3 6 1, x2 + x3 6 1}. Given λ > 0 and close to zero, we consider
the almost horizontal and vertical lines given by
Hλ(x2) = (x2, λ(1− x2)), Vλ(x3) = (λ(1− x3), x3).
Theorem 2. Given λ > 0 close to zero and a > 0, there exist A ∈ R3×3 such that 0 < aij < a,
satisfying that
(i) (0, 0) is an attractor and the horizontal line (x1, 0), 0 6 x1 < 1 and vertical line (0, x2), 0 6
x2 < 1 are contained in the basin of attraction of (0, 0);
(ii) (1, 0) and (0, 1) are repellers;
(iii) there is a point p = (p1, p2) with p1 + p2 = 1 which is an attractor;
(iv) the region bounded by Hλ, Vλ and x1 + x2 = 1 is contained in the basin of attraction of p.
Proof. To prove the result, we choose A ∈ R3×3 such that for any (x2, x3) ∈ Hλ and (x2, x3) ∈ Vλ
follows that X(x2, x3) points towards the region bounded by Hλ, Vλ and x1 + x2 = 1. For that, it
is enough to show that
X3(Hλ(x2))
X2(Hλ(x2))
=
λ(1− x2)F3(H(x2))
|x2F2(H(x2))| >
1
4
, F3(H(x2)) > 0 for
λ
1− λ < x2 < 1, (21)
and
X2(Vλ(x3))
X3(Vλ(x3))
=
λ(1− x3)F2(V (x3))
|x3F3(V (x3))| >
1
4
, F2(V (x3)) > 0 for
λ
1− λ < x3 < 1, (22)
where ( λ1−λ ,
λ
1−λ) is the intersection point of Hλ and Vλ. Recall the definition of N ∈ R2,M ∈ R2×2
that induce the replicator dynamics in affine coordinates. Given λ we assume that
(i) N2 = N3,
(ii) M32N3 =
M23
N3
= 1λ ,
(iii) M22N2 =
M33
N2
= 2.
To get that, and recalling the relation between the coordinates of M and A (recall identities 13),
we choose the matrix A such that
(i) a33−a13N3 = 3,
a22−a12
N2
= 3;
(ii) a32 > a22, a23 > a33 and
a32−a22
N2
= a23−a33N2 =
1
λ − 2.
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With this assumption, now we prove that inequality (21) is satisfied: Let us denote x := x2 and we
first calculate F3(x, λ(x− 1)) and F2(x, λ(x− 1)),
F3(x, λ(1− x)) = N3 +M32x+M33λ(1− x)−
[x(N2 +M22x+M23λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(N3 +M32x+M33λ(1− x))]
so,
F3(x, λ(1 − x))
N3
= 1 +
M32
N3
x+
M33
N3
λ(1− x)−
[x(
N2
N3
+
M22
N3
x+
M23
N3
λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(1 + M32
N3
x+
M33
N3
λ(1− x))]
= 1 +
1
λ
x+ 2λ(1 − x)−
[x(1 + 2x+
1
λ
λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(1 + 1
λ
x+ 2λ(1 − x))]
= 1 + 2λ+ (
1
λ
− 2λ)x− [2λ2 + λ+ (3− λ− 4λ2)x+ 2λ2x2]
= 1 + λ− 2λ2 + (1
λ
− λ+ 4λ2 − 3)x− 2λ2x2,
F2(x, λ(1− x)) = N2 +M22x+M23λ(1− x)−
[x(N2 +M22x+M23λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(N3 +M32x+M33λ(1− x))]
so,
F2(x, λ(1 − x))
N2
= 1 +
M22
N2
x+
M23
N2
λ(1 − x)−
[x(1 +
M22
N2
x+
M23
N2
λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(1 + M32
N2
x+
M33
N2
λ(1− x))]
= 1 + 2x+
1
λ
λ(1− x)−
[x(1 + 2x+
1
λ
λ(1− x)) + λ(1− x)(1 + 1
λ
x+ 2λ(1− x))]
= 2 + x− [x+ 2x2 + (1− x)[1 + λ+ 2λ2 + (1− 2λ2)x]]
= (1− x)[2(1 + x)− [1 + λ+ 2λ2 + (1− 2λ2)x]]
= (1− x)[1− λ− 2λ2 + (1 + 2λ2)x].
Therefore, on one hand observe that 1 + λ − 2λ2 + ( 1λ − λ + 4λ2 − 3)x − 2λ2x2 is a quadratic
polynomial with negative leading term that is positive at 1 and λ1−λ (provided that |λ| is small) so
is positive for λλ−1 < x < 1, on the other hand (1 − x)[1 − λ− 2λ2 + (1 + 2λ2)x] is positive in the
same range, so
λ(x− 1)F3(x, λ(x − 1))
|xF2(x, λ(x − 1))| =
λ[1 + λ− 2λ2 + ( 1λ − λ+ 4λ2 − 3)x− 2λ2x2]
x[1− λ− 2λ2 + (1 + 2λ2)x] ;
since the minimum of the numerator is attained at λ1−λ getting a value close to 1 and the maximum
of the denominator is attained at 1 getting a value close to 2, follows that in the range λλ−1 < x < 1
holds
λ(x− 1)F3(x, λ(x − 1))
|xF2(x, λ(x− 1))| >
1
3
,
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Figure 3: Comparing strategies by pairs is not enough.
and therefore the inequality (21) is proved. The proof of inequality (22) is similar and left for the
reader.
Remark 6. Observe that under the hypothesis of theorem 2 the point ( λλ+1 ,
λ
λ+1) is not in the basin
of attraction of e1.
Remark 7. It is natural to wonder if the conditions of theorem 1 are necessary? More pre-
cisely,theorem 1 provides a lower bound in the size of the basin of attraction related to information
on the payoff matrix. We could wonder if the lower bound also works as an upper bound: is it
true that if 1M0 is small then the basin of attraction is small? Previous shows that under certain
conditions, this is the case.
4 Uniformly large basin of attraction
In the rest of the paper we study the replicator dynamics when the matrix of payoffs is given by a
finite set of strategies S = {s1, . . . , sn} from an infinitely repeated prisoners’ dilemma game with
discount factor δ and error probability 1 − p. It is well known, that any strict subgame perfect is
an attractor in any population containing it. In this case, with Bloc(s, δ, p,S) we denote the local
basin of attraction of s in any set of strategies S and identifying s with s1. Related to that we give
the following definition:
Definition 3. We say that a strategy s has a uniformly large basin if there is K0 verifying that for
any finite set of strategies S containing s and any δ and p close to one, it holds that
{(x1, . . . , xn) : x2 + · · ·+ xn 6 K0} ⊂ Bloc(s, p, δ,S)
where n = cardinal(S).
One particular case of previous definition is when S has only one strategy different than s. In
this case, and based on remark 4 we can obtain the following remark:
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Lemma 11. If s has a uniformly large basin then there exists C0 such that for any strategy s
∗ and
for any p, δ large (independently of s∗) follows that
Uδ,p(s
∗, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s∗, s) < C0.
In particular,
lim
δ→1
lim
p→1
Uδ,p(s
∗, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s∗, s) < C0.
The goal of this paper is to understand which characteristics of strategies lead them to have
uniformly large basin of attraction. We show first that a strategy that is commonly used in the
literature, grim, does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction. Then, we show that is due
to the fact that grim never forgives a defection. As a positive results we show that another well
known strategy, win-stay-lose-shift, does have a uniformly large basin of attraction under certain
conditions.
5 The importance of forgiveness
In this section we show the importance of forgiveness for the evolutionary robustness of strategies.
First we prove that neither the strategy Grim nor Always Defect has a uniformly large basin of
attraction. Recall that Grim is the strategy that cooperates in the first period and then cooperates
if there has been no defection before. We provide the proof for Grim and we observe that this proof
is obviously adapted for Always Defect. T prove that Grim (g from now on) does not have a large
uniformly basin of attraction, we are going to find a strategy s such that when the population with
g and s is considered, the basin of attraction of g is arbitrary small provided that δ and p are close
to 1. In fact, we use the equation (20) to determine the boundary point pg,s =
1
1+
Uδ,p(s,s)−Uδ,p(g,s)
Uδ,p(g,g)−Uδ,p(s,g)
of
the basin of attraction of g (the smaller pg,s is, the smaller the basin of attraction of g is). Relatedly,
Myerson [M] proved that whenever the strategy Always Defect is compared with Grim (without
tremble), its basin of attraction collapses as the discount factor converges to one.
Theorem 3. Grim does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction. More precisely, there exists
a strategy s such that for any population S = {s, g} and ǫ > 0 small, there exist p0, δ0 such that for
any p > p0, δ > δ0, the size of the basin of attraction of grim is smaller than ǫ.
Proof. We consider the strategy s that behaves like g but forgives defections in the first period
(t = 0). We need to show that for any ǫ > 0 small, there exist p0, δ0 such that for any p > p0, δ > δ0,
follows that
1
1 +
Uδ,p(s,s)−Uδ,p(g,s)
Uδ,p(g,g)−Uδ,p(s,g)
< ǫ.
From the definition of s, for any h verifying that h0 6= (D,D) and any t it follows that
pg,g(ht) = ps,g(ht) = pg,s(ht) = ps,s(ht).
Therefore,
Uδ,p(s, s/(C,C)) = Uδ,p(s, g/(C,C)) = Uδ,p(g, g/(C,C)) = Uδ,p(g, s/(C,C)),
Uδ,p(s, s/(D,C)) = Uδ,p(s, g/(D,C)) = Uδ,p(g, g/(D,C)) = Uδ,p(g, s/(D,C)),
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Uδ,p(s, s/(C,D)) = Uδ,p(s, g/(C,D)) = Uδ,p(g, g/(C,D)) = Uδ,p(g, s/(C,D)),
so
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(g, s) = Uδ,p(s, s/(D,D))ps,s(D,D)− Uδ,p(g, s/(D,D))pg,s(D,D),
Uδ,p(g, g) − Uδ,p(s, g) = Uδ,p(g, g/(D,D))pg,g(D,D)− Uδ,p(s, g/(D,D))ps,g(D,D).
Recalling that s after (D,D) behaves as g and g after (D,D) behaves as the strategy always defect
(denoted as a) and ps,s(D,D) = ps,g(D,D) = pg,s(D,D) = pg,g(D,D) = (1− p)2, then
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(g, s) = (1− p)2δ[Uδ,p(g, g) − Uδ,p(a, g)],
Uδ,p(g, g) − Uδ,p(s, g) = (1− p)2δ[Uδ,p(a, a)− Uδ,p(g, a)].
Therefore, it remains to calculate the payoffs involving a and g. Also observe that for any path h
if we take k as the first non-negative integer such that hk 6= (C,C) then for any t > k ps1,s2(ht) =
ps1,s2(hk)pa,a(σ
k(h)t−k) where s1 and s2 is either g or a and σ
k(h) is a history path that verifies
σk(h)j = hj+k.
Therefore
Uδ,p(g, g/hk) = Uδ,p/hk(a, g) = Uδ,p(g, a/hk) = Uδ,p/hk(a, a).
So, noting with (C,C)t a path of t consecutive simultaneous cooperation and
L =
∑
t>0,ht
δtpa,a(ht)u(ht) =
1
1− δ [(1− p)
2R+ (S + T )(1− p)p+ p2P ],
follows that
Uδ,p(g, g) − Uδ,p(a, g) =
(1− δ){
∑
t>0
δtu(C,C)[pg,g((C,C)
t)− pa,g((C,C)t)] +
∑
t>0
δt[u(C,D) + δL][pg,g((C,C)
t(C,D)− pa,g((C,C)t(C,D))] +
∑
t>0
δt[u(D,C) + δL][pg,g((C,C)
t(D,C))− pa,g((C,C)t(D,C))] +
∑
t>0
δt[u(D,D) + δL][pg,g((C,C)
t(D,D))− pa,g((C,C)t(D,D))]} =
(1− δ){
∑
t>1
δt−1R[p2t − pt(1− p)t] +
∑
t>0
δt[S + δL][p2tp(1− p)− pt(1− p)t(1− p)2] +
∑
t>0
δt[T + δL][p2t(1− p)p− pt(1− p)tp2] +
∑
t>0
δt[P + δL][p2t(1− p)2 − pt(1− p)t(1− p)p]}.
Therefore
Uδ,p(g, g) − Uδ,p(a, g) = (1− δ)GA(δ, p)
where
GA(δ, p) = R[
p2
1− p2δ −
p(1− p)
1− p(1− p)δ ] + [S + δL][
p(1 − p)
1− p2δ −
(1− p)2
1− p(1− p)δ ] +
[T + δL][
(1 − p)p
1− p2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] + [P + δL][
(1 − p)2
1− p2δ −
(1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ].
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and we write
GA(δ, p) = GA0(δ, p) +GA1(δ, p)
where
GA0(δ, p) = R[
p2
1− p2δ −
p(1− p)
1− p(1− p)δ ] + S[
p(1− p)
1− p2δ −
(1− p)2
1− p(1− p)δ ] +
T [
(1− p)p
1− p2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] + P [
(1− p)2
1− p2δ −
(1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ] =
[Rp2 + (S + T )p(1− p) + P (1− p)2][ 1
1− p2δ −
1
1− p(1− p)δ ],
GA1(δ, p) = δL[
p(1 − p)
1− p2δ −
(1− p)2
1− p(1− p)δ ] +
δL[
(1 − p)p
1− p2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] + δL[
(1 − p)2
1− p2δ −
(1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ] =
δL[
1− p2
1 − p2δ −
1− (1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ].
Observe that when p, δ → 1 then
Rp2 + (S + T )p(1− p) + P (1− p)2 → R, 1
1− p(1− p)δ → 1,
1− (1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ → 1
and recalling that (1− δ)L = Pˆ = (1− p)2R+(S +T )(1− p)p+ p2P then for δ, p large follows that
(1− δ)GA0(δ, p) > R
2
1− δ
(1− p2δ) (23)
(1− δ)GA1(δ, p) > Pˆ
2
1− p2
(1− p2δ) . (24)
In the same way
Uδ,p(a, a)− Uδ,p(g, a) =
(1− δ){
∑
t>0
δtu(C,C)[pa,a((C,C)
t)− pg,a((C,C)t)] +
∑
t>0
δt[u(C,D) + δL][pa,a((C,C)
t(C,D) − pg,a((C,C)t(C,D))] +
∑
t>0
δt[u(D,C) + δL][pa,a((C,C)
t(D,C))− pg,a((C,C)t(D,C))] +
∑
t>0
δt[u(D,D) + δL][pa,a((C,C)
t(D,D))− pg,a((C,C)t(D,D))]} =
(1− δ){
∑
t>1
δt−1R[(1− p)2t − pt(1− p)t] +
∑
t>0
δt[S + δL][(1 − p)2tp(1− p)− pt(1− p)tp2] +
∑
t>0
δt[T + δL][(1 − p)2t(1− p)p− pt(1− p)t(1− p)2] +
∑
t>0
δt[P + δL][(1 − p)2tp2 − pt(1− p)t(1− p)p]}.
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Therefore
Uδ,p(a, a)− Uδ,p(g, a) = (1− δ)AG(δ, p)
where
AG(δ, p) = R[
(1− p)2
1− (1− p)2δ −
p(1− p)
1− p(1− p)δ ] + [S + δL][
p(1− p)
1 − (1− p)2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] +
[T + δL][
(1− p)p
1 − (1− p)2δ −
(1− p)2
1− p(1− p)δ ] + [P + δL][
p2
1 − (1− p)2δ −
(1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ]
and we write
AG(δ, p) = AG0(δ, p) +AG1(δ, p)
where
AG0(δ, p) = R[
(1− p)2
1− (1− p)2δ −
p(1− p)
1− p(1− p)δ ] + S[
p(1− p)
1− (1− p)2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] +
T [
(1− p)p
1− (1− p)2δ −
(1− p)2
1− p(1− p)δ ] + P [
p2
1− (1− p)2δ −
(1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ]
AG1(δ, p) = δL[
p(1− p)
1 − (1− p)2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] +
δL[
(1− p)p
1 − (1− p)2δ −
(1− p)2
1− p(1− p)δ ] + δL[
p2
1 − (1− p)2δ −
(1− p)p
1− p(1− p)δ ] =
δL[
2p(1− p)
1 − (1− p)2δ −
1− p
1− p(1− p)δ ] + δL[
p2
1 − (1− p)2δ −
p2
1− p(1− p)δ ] =
δL[
2p(1− p)
1 − (1− p)2δ −
1− p
1− p(1− p)δ ] + δL[
p2(1− p)
(1 − (1− p)2δ)(1 − p(1− p)δ) ] =
δL(1 − p)[ 2p
1− (1− p)2δ −
1− p
1− p(1− p)δ +
p2δ
(1− (1− p)2δ)(1 − p(1− p)δ) ]
Observe that when p, δ → 1 then
AG0(δ, p) → AG0(1, 1) = P − S,
2p
1− (1− p)2δ −
1− p
1− p(1− p)δ +
p2δ
(1− (1− p)2δ)(1 − p(1− p)δ) → 3
and recalling that (1− δ)L = Pˆ = (1− p)2R+(S +T )(1− p)p+ p2P then for δ, p large follows that
(1− δ)AG0(δ, p) 6 2(1 − δ)(P − S) (25)
(1− δ)AG1(δ, p) 6 4(1− p)Pˆ . (26)
Recall now that the size of the basin of attraction of a is given by
E(δ, p) :=
1
1 + (1−δ)GA(δ,p)(1−δ)AG(δ,p)
.
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Observe that for any ǫ > 0 for p, δ large then from inequalities (23) and (25)
(1− δ)AG0(δ, p) 6 ǫ(1− δ)GA0(δ, p)
and from inequalities (24) and (26)
(1− δ)AG1(δ, p) 6 ǫ(1− δ)GA1(δ, p),
therefore, for p, δ large
E(δ, p) 6
1
1 + 1ǫ
=
ǫ
1 + ǫ
and so the theorem is concluded.
Theorem 3 shows that the well known strategy grim does not have a uniformly large basin of
attraction given that after a defection it behaves like always defect, which does not a uniformly
large basin of attraction either. In an world with trembles unforgivingness is evolutionary costly.
We formalize next the idea of unforgivingness and and provide a general results regarding the basin
of attraction of unforgiving strategies.
Definition 4. We say that a strategy s is unforgiving if there exists a history ht that s(ht+τ/ht) = D
for all ht+τ with τ = 0, 1, 2....
Theorem 4. Unforgiving strategies do not have a uniformly large basin of attraction.
The proof is similar to the proof of theorem 3 with the difference that the first point of divergence
may not be t = 1.
6 Efficiency and size of basin of attraction
In the present section we study the relationship between efficiency of a strategy and the size of its
basin of attraction. Roughly speaking, full efficiency means that strategies cooperate with itself.
Given a history ht, and a pair of strategies s, s
∗ we define
U(s, s/ht) = lim
δ→1
lim
p→1
Uδ,p(s, s/ht).
Definition 5. We say that a strategy s is efficient if for any finite path ht follows that
U(s, s/ht) = R.
In next subsection we prove that strategies having a uniformly large basin of attraction are
efficient provided that the strategies are symmetric. In subsection 6.2 we discuss the case of non-
symmetric strategy provided some form of weak efficiency.
6.1 The symmetric case
Definition 6. We say that a strategy s is symmetric if for any finite path ht it follows that
s(ht) = s(hˆt).
Theorem 5. If s has a uniform large basin of attraction and is symmetric, then it is efficient.
The previous result established efficiency if the probability of mistake is much smaller than 1−δ.
An easy corollary is the following:
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Corollary 1. If s has uniform large basin of attraction and is symmetric, then for any R0 < R
there exists δ0 := δ0(s) such that for any δ > δ0 there exists p0(δ) verifying that if δ > δ0, p > p0(δ)
then
Uδ,p(s, s/ht) > R0
for any history ht.
Here it is important to compare the statement of theorem 3 with theorem 5 and corollary 1.
First, observe that the conclusion of theorem 3 is obtained for any δ > δ0 and any p > p0; instead,
in corollary 1 is for d > δ0 but p > p(δ)with p(δ) strongly depending of δ. Second, a weaker version
of theorem 3 can be concluded from corollary 1.
Lemma 12. If s has a uniformly large basin of attraction, then there exists C0 such that for any
s∗ and ht follows that
lim
δ→1
lim
p→1
Uδ,p(s
∗, s∗/ht)− Uδ,p(s, s∗/ht) + Uδ,p(s∗, s∗/hˆt)− Uδ,p(s, s∗/hˆt)
Uδ,p(s, s/ht)− Uδ,p(s∗, s/ht) + Uδ,p(s, s/hˆt)− Uδ,p(s∗, s/hˆt)
< C0.
Proof. It follows immediately from lemma 11 considering a strategy s∗ such that the first deviation
from s occurs at ht (and obviously also at hˆt).
Proof of theorem 5: Let us assume that there exists a path ht and λ0 < 1 such that
U(s, s/ht) = λ0R
and s is a sub game perfect. We start assuming that ht is not symmetric. Then we show how to
deal with the symmetric case using the asymmetric one.
From the fact that s is symmetric, then follows that
U(s, s/ht) = U(s, s/hˆt)
and therefore
U(s, s/ht) + U(s, s/hˆt) = 2λ0R.
Moreover, since U(s, s/ht) < R, we can assume that s(ht) = D. We are going to build a strategy
s∗ such that
(i) U(s∗, s∗/ht) = U(s
∗, s∗/hˆt) = R,
(ii) s∗ acts like s after meeting s at ht and hˆt.
To build that strategy s∗, first we take s∗ such that s∗(ht) = s
∗(hˆt) = C and then we consider all
the paths that follows after ht, hˆt for the pairs s, s; s
∗, s; s, s∗; s∗, s∗:
(i) ht(D,D), hˆt(D,D) for s, s
(ii) ht(C,D), hˆt(C,D) for s
∗, s
(iii) ht(D,C), hˆt(D,C) for s, s
∗
(iv) ht(C,C), hˆt(C,C) for s
∗, s∗.
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Observe that the paths involving ht are all different and the same holds for the paths involving hˆt.
Now we request that s∗ after ht(C,C) and hˆt(C,C) plays C for ever, so
hs∗,s∗/ht = (C,C) . . . (C,C) . . . , hs∗,s∗/hˆt = (C,C) . . . (C,C) . . . ,
and so
U(s∗, s∗/ht) = U(s
∗, s∗/hˆt) = R.
We also request that
s∗(ht(C,D)) = s(ht(C,D)), s
∗(hˆt(C,D)) = s(hˆt(C,D)),
and observe that both requirement can be satisfied simultaneously and inductively we get that
hs∗,s/ht(C,D) = hs,s/ht(C,D), hs∗,s/hˆt(C,D) = hs,s/hˆt(C,D).
From the fact that s is symmetric, it follows that each entry of hs∗,s/ht(C,D) = hs,s/ht(C,D) and
hs∗,s/hˆt(C,D) = hs,s/hˆt(C,D) is (C,C) or (D,D) and recalling equality 7 follows that
U(s∗, s/h) + U(s∗, s/hˆ) = U(s, s∗/h) + U(s, s∗/hˆ).
Since, s is a sub game perfect (otherwise it would not have a uniform large basin of attraction) then
U(s∗, s/ht) + U(s
∗, s/hˆt) < 2λ0R and therefore U(s, s
∗/ht) + U(s, s
∗/ht) < 2λ0R; by remark (12)
follows that if we denote U(s∗, s/ht) + U(s
∗, s/hˆt) = 2λ1R, then
1− λ1
λ0 − λ1 < C0, (27)
and taking a positive constant C1 < 1− λ0 < 1− λ1 it follows that λ1 satisfies inequality
C1
λ0 − λ1 < C0. (28)
Therefore, it follows that there exists γ > 0 such that
λ1 < λ0 − γ.
Now, we consider the path ht(C,D) and we denote it as ht2 and as before we construct a new
strategy s∗2 that satisfies the same type of properties as the one satisfied by s
∗ respect to s but on
the path ht2 instead on the path ht. Inductively, we construct a sequences of paths hti , strategies
s∗i and constants λi such that
U(s∗i , s/hti) = λiR (29)
and they satisfy the following equation equivalent to (27)
1− λi+1
λi − λi+1 < C0, (30)
and since λi+1 < λi then also satisfy an equation equivalent to (28)
C1
λi − λi+1 < C0. (31)
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and therefore
λi+1 < λi − iγ
but this implies that λi → −∞ and so U(s∗, s/hti) → −∞, a contradiction because utilities along
equilibrium are bounded by P.
To finish, we have to deal with the case that ht is symmetric and U(s, s/ht) < R. Recall that
we can assume that s(ht) = s(hˆt) = D. Now, let us consider the sequel path ht(C,D). We claim
that if U(s, s/ht) < R then
U(s, s/ht(C,D)) < R.
In fact, we can consider the strategy s∗ such that only differs on ht and after that plays the same as s
plays. Since s is a sub game perfect (otherwise it would not have a uniform large basin of attraction),
it follows that Uδ,p(s, s/ht) > Uδ,p(s
∗, s/ht) therefore, U(s, s/ht) = limδ→1 limp→1Uδ,p(s, s/ht) >
limδ→1 limp→1 Uδ,p(s
∗, s/ht), but since
lim
δ→1
lim
p→1
Uδ,p(s
∗, s/ht) = lim
δ→1
lim
p→1
Uδ,p(s, s/ht(C,D)) = U(s, s/ht(C,D))
the claim follows.
Observe that the new path ht(C,D) now is not symmetric and since U(s, s/ht(C,D)) < R, to
conclude the proof of theorem 5 we argue as above.
It remains to be shown that there exists strategies with uniformly large basins of attraction.
To do that we must first develop some simple way of calculating payoffs under the presence of
trembles. This calculations will help us prove that there exist strategies with uniformly large basins
of attractions.
6.2 Non-symmetric strategies
We are going to provide a series of results about weak forms of efficiency for strategies having a
uniform large basin of attraction without assuming that the strategies are symmetric. The first
ones actually only compare pair of strategies; in other words, it is only used that the strategies has
a uniform large basin of attraction in populations with two strategies (see propositions 1 and 2 and
theorem 6); moreover, theorem 6 gives a lower estimate of the size of the basin related to a quantity
that measure the non-symmetry of a strategy.
In theorems 7 and 8 we show that if there is a history such that a strategy is not fully efficient
for any subsequent path, then it can not have a uniform large basin of attraction. The proof of
both theorems are based on theorem 2 where we analyzed the dynamics of a population of three
strategies.
Proposition 1. If s has a uniformly large basin of attraction, then there exists ǫ > 0 such that for
any ht follows that
U(s, s/ht) > P + ǫ.
Proof. Choosing s∗ such that s∗(ht) 6= s(ht) and for any hk containing ht(s∗(ht), s(hˆt)) then
s(hk) = D follows that U(s
∗, s) > P and U(s, s∗) 6 P. Since also we can chose s∗ such that
hs∗,s∗/ht((s∗(ht),s∗(hˆt)) is a path of full cooperation, then by lemma 11 the conclusion of the proposi-
tion follows.
Observe that previous result is stronger that theorem 4 (provided that p is much closer to one
than δ) since here it is shown that strategies with uniformly large basin of attraction have a payoff
uniformly away from zero. Next result goes in the same direction but relating payoff with the size
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of the basin of attraction; actually, a lower bound in the basin of attraction provides a lower bound
on the payoff that a strategies get when plays with itself.
Proposition 2. If s has a uniformly large basin of attraction and for any p and δ large follows that
there exists k verifying Bk(s) ⊂ Bs(s), then
U(s, s/ht) > P + (R − P )k.
Proof. The proof is similar to the proof of proposition 1 and using remark 4 that estimate the size
of the basin of attraction when only two strategies are involved.
Next definition is related to the asymmetry of a strategy. In few words, it measures how frequent
is s(ht) 6= s(hˆt) along a path.
Definition 7. Given a strategy s, it is said that s is c−asymmetric if for any ht holds∑
j:uj(s,s/ht)=T
δj +
∑
j′:uj′(s,s/ht)=S
δj 6 c
and there are paths such that
∑
j:uj(s,s/ht)=T
δj +
∑
j′:uj′(s,s/ht)=S
δj is arbitrary close to c. In par-
ticular, if s is 0−asymmetric, then it follows that it is symmetric.
The next two lemmas relates the payoff of s with s starting at ht and starting at hˆt.
Lemma 13. Given a strategy s and a history ht it follows that
Uδ(s, s/hˆt) = Uδ(s, s/ht) + (x− y)(T − S),
where x =
∑
j:uj(s,s/ht)=S
δj and y =
∑
j′:uj′ (s,s/ht)=T
δj .
Proof. If Uδ(s, s/ht) = aR+ xS + yT + bP where a =
∑
j:uj(s,s/ht)=R
δj and b =
∑
j′:uj′(s,s/ht)=P
δj
then Uδ(s, s/hˆt) = aR+xT+yS+bP = Uδ(s, s/ht)+xT+yS−xS−yT = Uδ(s, s/ht)+(x−y)(T−S).
Lemma 14. Given a strategy s and a path ht it follows that if c = x + y then Uδ(s, s/hˆt) 6
Uδ(s, s/ht) + c(T − S) if c < R−Uδ(s,s/ht)R−S and Uδ(s, s/hˆt) 6 −Uδ(s, s/ht) + 2R + c(T + S − 2R)
otherwise.
Proof. From lemma 13 follow that Uδ(s, s/hˆt) = Uδ(s, s/ht) + (2x − c)(T − S). To conclude,
observe that under the restriction x + y = c, a + c + b = 1, a, b, x, y are in [0, 1] and Uδ(s, s/ht) =
aR + xS + yT + bP , the maximum of 2x − c is equal to c if c < R−Uδ(s,s/ht)R−S and is equal to
2R−Uδ(s,s/ht)T−S + c
T+S−2R
T−S otherwise.
Theorem 6. If s has a uniformly large basin of attraction in populations with two strategies and is
c−asymmetric, then for any ht follows that
U(s, s/ht) > R− 2c(T − S).
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Proof. Let us assume by contradiction that U(s, s/ht) < R1 − 32c(T − S) for some R1 < R. We
can assume also that if ht+1 (or hˆt+1) is the deviation from ht (or hˆt), i.e, the first coordinate of
ht+1 (or hˆt+1) is different to s(ht) (or s(hˆt)) but the second one is equal to s(hˆt) (or s(ht)) follows
that U(s, s/ht) − U(s, s/ht+1) (U(s, s/hˆt) − U(s, s/hˆt+1), respectively) is smaller than ε with ε
chosen arbitrary small (provided δ large and 1− p small). Now we take s∗ such that s∗(ht) 6= s(ht),
s∗(hˆt) 6= s(hˆt) and after that deviation s∗ is like s (observe that at this point we are using that s/ht is
not symmetric, but we can do that because otherwise if for any t, s(ht) = s(hˆt) we can argue as in the
proof of theorem 5). Moreover, we also assume that U(s∗, s∗/ht) = R and U(s
∗, s∗/hˆt) = R. From
the assumption, follows c < R−U(s,s/ht)T−S and so by lemma 14 U(s, s/hˆt) < R1− c(T −S). Therefore,
U(s∗, s/ht) < R1− 2c(T −S) and U(s∗, s/hˆt) < R1− c(T −S), so U(s, s∗/ht) < R1− c(T −S) and
U(s, s∗/hˆt) < R1 and therefore,
U(s∗, s∗/hˆt) + U(s
∗, s∗/ht)− [U(s, s∗/hˆt) + U(s, s∗/ht)] > R−R1 + c(T − S) > R−R1,
and since
U(s, s/ht) + U(s, s/hˆt)− [U(s∗, s/ht) + U(s∗, s/hˆt)]
is arbitrarily small, by lemma 11 follows that s does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Note that in previous results only populations of two strategies were used. Now we explore
consequences of considering groups of three strategies.
Theorem 7. Given a strategy s, if there exists ht such that for any hk either containing ht or hˆt
(either ht ⊂ hk or hˆt ⊂ hk) follows
U(s, s/hk) < R1
for some R1 < R then s does not have a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Proof. We are going to use theorem 2 which gives conditions, on group of three strategies, that
implies that one of the strategies is an attractor but has an arbitrary small basin of attraction.
More precisely, for s not to have a uniform large basin of attraction, it has to be shown that there
exists C0 > 0 such that for any ε > 0, there is s
∗ and s′ satisfying:
(i) 0 < U(s, s)− U(s∗, s) = U(s, s∗)− U(s∗, s∗) < ε;
(ii) 0 < U(s, s)− U(s′, s) = U(s, s′)− U(s′, s′) < ε;
(iii) U(s∗, s′)− U(s′, s′) > C0;
(iv) U(s′, s∗)− U(s∗, s∗) > C0.
Observe that under that above conditions, it follows from theorem 2 and remark 6 that once we
identify s with the vertex e1, the point (
ε
C0+2ε
, εC0+2ε) is not in the basin of e1.
Given ht such that for any hk that contains either ht or hˆt follows that U(s, s/hk) < R1 for some
R1 < R, we can also take ht such that for the deviation h
′
t+1 from ht (i.e, the first coordinate of
ht+1 is different to s(ht) but the second one is equal to s(hˆt)) follows that U(s, s/ht)−U(s, s/ht+1)
is smaller than ε with ε chosen arbitrary small, provided δ large and 1 − p small. Moreover, the
election can be done in such a way that the same holds for for hˆt.
Now we build two strategies s∗, s′, that upset s. The strategy s∗ deviate respect to s at ht but
coincide with s on hˆt. On the other hand, the strategy s
′ deviate respect to s at hˆt but coincide
with s on ht. Both strategies coincide with s after the first deviation with s. In other words:
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(i) s∗(ht) 6= s(ht) and s∗(hˆt) = s(hˆt);
(ii) s′(ht) = s(ht) and s
′(hˆt) 6= s(hˆt);
(iii) hs∗,s/ht(s∗(ht),s(hˆt)) = hs,s/ht(s∗(ht),s(hˆt)) and hs∗,s/hˆt(s∗(hˆt),s(ht)) = hs,s/hˆt(s∗(hˆt),s(ht));
(iv) hs′,s/ht(s′(ht),s(hˆt)) = hs,s/ht(s′(ht),s(hˆt)) and hs′,s/hˆt(s′(hˆt),s(ht)) = hs,s/hˆt(s′(hˆt),s(ht)).
Observe that from that properties follows:
(i) U(s, s∗/ht(s(ht), s
∗(hˆt))) = U(s, s/ht);
(ii) U(s∗, s∗/ht(s
∗(ht), s
∗(hˆt))) = U(s, s/ht(s
∗(ht), s(hˆt)));
(iii) U(s∗, s/hˆt) = U(s, s/hˆt), U(s, s
∗/hˆt) = U(s
∗, s∗/hˆt);
(iv) U(s, s′/hˆt(s(hˆt), s
′(ht))) = U(s, s/hˆt);
(v) U(s′, s′/hˆt(s
′(hˆt), s
′(ht))) = U(s, s/ht(s(hˆt), s(ht)));
(vi) U(s′, s/ht) = U(s, s/ht), U(s, s
′/ht) = U(s
′, s′/ht).
Therefore it follows that:
(i) U(s, s/ht)− U(s∗, s/ht) < ε and U(s, s/hˆt)− U(s∗, s/hˆt) = 0,
(ii) U(s, s/ht)− U(s′, s/hˆt) < ε and U(s, s/ht)− U(s′, s/ht) = 0,
(iii) U(s∗, s∗/ht)− U(s, s∗/ht) = −[U(s, s/ht)− U(s∗, s/ht)] and U(s∗, s∗/hˆt) = U(s, s∗/hˆt);
(iv) U(s′, s′/hˆt)− U(s, s′/hˆt) = −[U(s, s/hˆt)− U(s′, s/hˆt)] and U(s, s/ht) = U(s, s/ht).
Now we have to compare s′ and s∗. Observe that:
(i) hs′s∗/ht(s′(ht),s∗(hˆt)) = hss/ht(s(ht),s(hˆt)) so U(s
′, s∗/ht) is close to U(s
∗, s∗/ht),
(ii) hss′/hˆt(s∗(ht),s′(ht)) = hss/hˆt(s(hˆt),s(ht)) so U(s
∗, s′/hˆt) is close to U(s
′, s/hˆt).
Since s∗ and s′ deviate from s at ht and hˆt respectively and ht(s
∗(ht), s
′(hˆt)) is not one of the paths
previously listed, we can assume that
U(s∗s′/ht(s
∗(ht), s
′(hˆt)) = R.
In the same way,
U(s′s∗/hˆt(s
∗(hˆt), s
′(ht)) = R.
Therefore, and from the assumption that U(s, s/hk) < R1 follows that
U(s′s∗/ht) + U(s
′s∗/hˆt)− [U(s∗s∗/ht) + U(s∗s∗/hˆt)] > R−R1 − ε
and
U(s∗s′/ht) + U(s
∗s′/hˆt)− [U(s′s′/ht) + U(s′s′/hˆt)] > R−R1 − ε
and therefore the theorem is proved.
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From the proof of previous theorem it can be concluded the following (details are left for the
reader):
Theorem 8. If s has a uniformly large basin of attraction and let ht such that U(s, s/ht) is suffi-
ciently close to inf{U(s, s/hk) : ∀hk}. Then it follows that either
U(s, s/ht(s(ht), s(hˆt)) > R
or
U(s, s/hˆt(s(hˆt), s(ht)) > R,
where s(hk) = D if and only if s(hk) = C.
7 Revisiting the sufficient conditions to have a uniformly large
basin
In this section we provide general sufficient conditions to guarantee that a strategy has a uniformly
large basin (see definition 3), i.e., conditions that implies that a strategy has a uniform large basin
of attraction independent of the initial population, for large discount factor and small trembles.
This is based in theorem 1. In subsection 7.1 we introduce another type of condition which is easier
to calculate than the previous one and also implies that a given strategy satisfying it has a uniform
large basin of attraction.
Given two strategies s1 and s2, to avoid notation, we write
Nδ,p(s1, s2) := Uδ,p(s1, s1)− Uδ,p(s2, s1).
Let s be a subgame perfect strategy. Given s′ and s∗ with Nδ,p(s, s
∗) > Nδ,p(s, s
′) we consider the
following number
Mδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) :=
Nδ,p(s, s
∗) +Nδ,p(s, s
′) + Uδ,p(s
′, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) + Uδ,p(s∗, s′)− Uδ,p(s, s′),
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
.
Mδ,p(s) := sup
Nδ,p(s,s∗)>Nδ,p(s,s′)
{Mδ,p(s, s∗, s′), 0}.
Remark 8. If we take the payoff matrix associated to a set of strategies that includes s, s∗, s′ and
s = e1, s
∗ = ei, s
′ = ej it follows that Mδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) =
Mij+Mji
−Ni
as in lemma 1 and theorem 10.
Remark 9. Observe that in the case that s∗ = s′, the quantity Mδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) is equal to
2[Nδ,p(s, s
∗) +Nδ,p(s, s
∗)]
Nδ,p(s∗, s)
= 2Mδ,p(s, s
∗).
So, for the purpose of boundingMδ,p(s) from +∞ it is enough to take the supreme overMδ,p(s, s∗, s′).
Observe also that if we only consider the population {s, s∗} then the segment [0, 1Mδ(s,s∗)) is in the
basin of attraction of s (provided that s is identified with e1).
Definition 8. We say that a strategy s satisfies the “Large Basin strategy condition" if it is a
subgame perfect strategy and if there exist δ0 and M0 such that for any δ > δ0 and p > p(δ) there
exists M0(δ) verifying
Mδ,p(s) < M0(δ) <∞.
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We can also define
M(s) := lim sup
δ,p→1
Mδ,p(δ)(s)
and observe that in this case, if M(s) <∞ then s has a large basin of attraction (but the size could
depend on δ and p).
Remark 10. It is important to remark that it could hold that lim supδ→1 sups∗{Mδ,p(δ)(s, s∗)} < +∞
but M(s) = +∞. This means that to guarantee a uniform L1−size basin in any population, it is not
enough that a strategy has uniform size of basin against any other strategy.
Definition 9. We say that a strategy s satisfies the “ uniformly Large Basin condition" if it is a
strict subgame perfect strategy and
M(s) <∞.
Theorem 9. If s satisfies the “uniformly Large Basin condition”, then s has a uniformly large basin.
More precisely, let β be small. Then, there exists δ0 such that for any δ > δ0 (p > p(δ)) and any
finite set of strategies S containing s, follows that s is an attracting point such that
B(s) ⊂ Bsloc(s)
where
B(s) = {(x1, . . . , xn) : x2 + · · ·+ xn 6 1
M(s) + β
}
and n = cardinal(S).
Proof. The proof follows immediately from theorem 1 and the definition of M(s). In fact, ordering
the strategies in such a way that s corresponds to the first one and N(s, si) > N(s, sj) if j > i then
it follows that for δ large, then the constant M0 = sup{Mij+Mji−Nii , 0} < M(s)+β and therefore B(s)
is contained in the basin of attraction of e1.
Remark 11. Observe that to guarantee a uniform size of the basin of the attraction independent of
the population, it is enough to bound a condition that only involves pair of strategies.
Remark 12. Given a strict subgame perfect strategy s and a population S, the lower bound of the
size of the basin of attraction of s can be improved by taking
Mδ,p(s,S) := sup
Nδ,p(s,s∗)>Nδ,p(s,s′),s′,s∗∈S
{Mδ,p(s, s∗, s′), 0}.
To check that Mδ,p(s) < +∞ observe that
Mδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
=
Nδ,p(s, s
∗) +Nδ,p(s, s
′) + Uδ,p(s
′, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) + Uδ,p(s∗, s′)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
= 1 +
Nδ,p(s, s
′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
+
Uδ,p(s
′, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) + Uδ,p(s∗, s′)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
.
Then if
Zδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) :=
Uδ,p(s
′, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) + Uδ,p(s∗, s′)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
,
defining
Zδ,p(s) := sup
Nδ,p(s,s∗)>Nδ,p(s,s′)
{Zδ,p(s, s∗, s′)}
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and using that
Nδ,p(s,s
′)
Nδ,p(s,s∗)
6 1 then follows that Mδ,p(s) < +∞ if and only if Zδ,p(s) < +∞.
In other words, s is a “Large Basin strategy” if and only if Zδ,p(s) < +∞. Similarly, defining
Z(s) := lim sup
δ,p(δ)→1
Zδ,p(s),
s is a “uniform Large Basin strategy” if and only if
Z(s) < +∞.
Question 1. Is the uniformly large basin condition (recall definition 9) a necessary condition for a
strategy to have a uniformly large basin strategy?
7.1 Asymptotic bounded condition
We provide now a condition that implies that s is has a uniformly Large Basin of attraction. This
new conditions are based on the conditions defined before but are easier to calculate. Moreover, if
a strategy satisfies them it follows that has a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Definition 10. We say that a strict subgame perfect strategy s satisfies the asymptotic bounded
condition if
– there exists R0 such that for any s
∗ holds
lim sup
δ→1,p→1,p>p(δ)
sup
s∗:Nδ,p(s,s∗)>0
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ(s, s∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
< R0, (32)
– there exists R1 such that for any s
∗, s′ for which Nδ,p(s, s
∗) > Nδ,p(s, s
∗) holds, then
lim sup
δ→1,p→1,p>p(δ)
sup
s∗:Nδ(s,s∗)>0
Uδ,p(s
′, s∗) + Uδ,p(s
∗, s′)− 2Uδ,p(s, s)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
< R1. (33)
Theorem 10. Let s be a strict subgame perfect strategy satisfying the asymptotic bounded condition.
Then, s has a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Proof. Recalling that Nδ,p(s, s
′) 6 Nδ,p(s, s
∗) we need to bound by above the following expression
Uδ,p(s
′, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) + Uδ,p(s∗, s′)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
.
So,
Uδ,p(s
′, s∗)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) + Uδ,p(s∗, s′)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
=
=
Uδ,p(s
′, s∗) + Uδ,p(s
∗, s′)− 2Uδ,p(s, s)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
+
+
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
+
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6
6 R1 +
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
+
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s
′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6 R1 + 2R0.
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From now on, we denote
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗) := Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗) (34)
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) := Uδ,p(s
′, s∗) + Uδ,p(s
∗, s′)− 2Uδ,p(s, s) (35)
Remark 13. From the proof of theorem 10 follows that M(s) 6 2 + 2R0 +R1.
7.2 Having uniform large basin for population of two strategies is not enough
In this section we give an example that shows that when a population of three strategies are
considered it can happen that one of them has a uniformly large basin when we consider the
subset of two strategies but it does not have a large basin when the three strategies are considered
simultaneously. In other words, next theorem shows that the example given in theorem 2 can
be obtained as the replicator equation associated to three strategies. In what follows, given a
population of three strategies S = {s, s∗, s′} and its replicator equation (in affine coordinates), the
first strategy is identified with the point (0, 0). In the theorem below we considered the repeated
prisoners’ dilemma without tremble and the proof in trivially adapted for the case of trembles
provided small probability of mistakes.
Theorem 11. For any λ small, there exists a population of three strategies S = {s, s∗, s′} such that
(i) s is an attractor in S;
(ii) s always cooperate with itself;
(iii) in the population {s, s∗}, s is a global attractor (in the terminology of the replicator equation,
the interior of the simplex associated to {s, s∗} is in the basin of attraction of s);
(iv) in the population {s, s′} s is a global attractor;
(v) the region bounded by Hλ, Vλ and x2 + x3 = 1 does not intersect the basin of attraction of s.
Proof. Given any small λ > 0, we build three strategies such that identifying s with (0, 0), s∗ with
(1, 0) and s′ with (0, 1) satisfy the hypothesis of theorem 2. We also assume that the strategies s′ and
s∗ deviate from s at the 0−history, s plays always cooperate with itself and so s′(0) = s∗(0) = D.
We fix γ > 0 and we take ǫ small. Observe that provided any ǫ > 0 small, taking δ large, follows
that there exist different b′1, b
′
2, b
′
3, b
′
4 and b
∗
1, b
∗
2, b
∗
3, b
∗
4 such that
0 < R− (b′1R+ b′2T + b′3S + b′4P ) = R− (b∗1R+ b∗2T + b∗3S + b∗4P ) = ǫ
but
R− (b′1R+ b′2S + b′3T + b′4P ) = R− (b∗1R+ b∗2S + b∗3T + b∗4P ) > γ.
Now, from (C,D) we choose s, s′, s∗ such that
Uδ(s, s
∗) = Uδ(s, s
′) = b′1R+ b
′
2T + b
′
3S + b
′
4P
but in such a way that s′ 6= s∗. To show that it is possible to choose s′ independently of s∗ against
s is enough to take s′(C,D) 6= s∗(C,D). Now, we take s∗ and s′ from (D,D) such that
s∗(D,D) 6= s′(D,D)
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and
Uδ(s
∗, s∗)− Uδ(s, s∗) = Uδ(s∗, s∗)− (b∗1R+ b∗2S + b∗3T + b∗4P ) = −ǫ,
Uδ(s
′, s′)− Uδ(s, s′) = Uδ(s′, s′)− (b′1R+ b′2S + b′3T + b′4P ) = −ǫ.
Moreover, we can take s′, s∗ such that
Uδ(s
′, s∗) = Uδ(s
′, s∗) = R
therefore,
Uδ(s
′, s∗)− Uδ(s∗, s∗) = Uδ(s′, s∗)− Uδ(s′, s′) > γ.
So,
Uδ(s
′, s∗)− Uδ(s∗, s∗)
Uδ(s, s)− Uδ(s∗, s) >
γ
ǫ
and so choosing ǫ properly we can assume that the quotient is equal to 1λ .
Remark 14. Previous results can also be proved using a generalized versions of the Folklore’s
theorem: Any payoff matrix can be realized as the payoff matrix of a finite set of strategies, provided
that δ is large, the entries of the matrices are in the admissible range of payoff and the entries aij , aji
satisfy the relation given by lemma 6.
8 Recalculating payoff with trembles
Now, we develop a way to calculate the payoff for certain strategies which roughly speaking consists
in approximating the payoff using equilibrium paths, provided that the probability of mistake is
small. This first order approximation allows to prove the asymptotic bounded condition (see in-
equalities (32), (33), (38), (40) and lemma 17) for certain types of strategies (namely strict subgame
perfect strategies, see definition 11). In few words, the difference in utility between two strategies
can be estimated in the following way (provided that p is sufficiently close to 1):
• first, we consider all the paths (on and off equilibrium) up to its first node of divergence
between the two strategies, namely hk, hˆk (see equalities (36, 37, 39)),
• from the node of divergence we only consider equilibrium payoffs (see lemma 16 ).
In particular, if s(h0) 6= s∗(h0) then Uδ,p(s, s) − Uδ,p(s∗, s) is approximated by Uδ,p,hs,s(s, s) −
Uδ,p,hs∗,s(s
∗, s).
More precisely, recalling that
Nδ,p(s, s
∗) =
∑
hk,h∈R
∗
s,s∗
δkps,s(hk)[Uδ,p(s, s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(s∗, s/hkhˆk)]. (36)
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗) =
∑
hk,h∈R
∗
s,s∗
δkps,s(hk)[Uδ,p(s, s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(s, s∗/hkhˆk)]. (37)
we define
N eδ,p(s, s
∗) :=
∑
hk,h∈R
∗
s,s∗
δkps,s(hk)[Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hkhˆk)].
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N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗) :=
∑
hk,h∈R
∗
s,s∗
δkps,s(hk)[Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs,s∗/hkhˆk)]
where given strategies s1, s2
Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hkhˆk) := Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hk) + Uδ,p(hs1,s2/hk).
We look for conditions such that there exists a uniform constant C satisfying that
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6
N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)
+ C. (38)
We develop a similar approach Bδ,p(s, s
′, s∗) (see equation (35)) that consists in comparing different
paths for three strategies s, s∗, s′. Given any pair of paths h, hˆ where s, s′, s∗ differ (meaning that
at least two of the strategies differ at some finite paths contained either in h or hˆ), there exist k′ =
k(s, s′, h), kˆ′ = kˆ(s, s′, )ˆ, k∗ = k(s, s∗, h), kˆ∗ = kˆ(s, s∗, hˆ), such that s(hk′) 6= s′(hk′), s(hˆk′) 6= s′(hˆk′)
and s(hˆk∗) 6= s∗(hˆk∗). Observe that some of them could be infinity.
We take
k(s, s′, s∗) := min{k′, kˆ′, k∗, kˆ∗}
which is finite and observe that
pss(hk) = ps′s∗(hk) = ps∗s′(hk) = ps∗s(hk) = ps′s(hk)
pss(hˆk) = ps′s∗(hˆk) = ps∗s′(hˆk) = ps∗s(hˆk) = ps′s(hˆk).
so
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) =
∑
h:k(s,s′,s∗)
δkpss(hk)[Uδ,p(s
′, s∗/hkhˆk) + Uδ,p(s
∗, s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(s, s/hkhˆk)]. (39)
Now we define
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) =
∑
h:k(s,s′,s∗)
δkpss(hk)[Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hk hˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)].
So, in a similar way we look for conditions such that there exists a uniform constant C
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)
+ C. (40)
We are going to restrict a relation between p and δ. From now on we assume that
p >
√
δ. (41)
Moreover, and to simplify calculations we change the usual renormalization factor 1 − δ by 1−p2δ
p2
and so we calculate the payoff as following:
Uδ,p(s1, s2) =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
t>0,at,bt
δtps1,s2(at, bt)u(a
t, bt).
Both ways calculating the payoff (either with renormalization 1− δ or 1−p2δ
p2
) are equivalent as they
rank histories in the same way. In addition it holds that:
1
2
<
1− δ
1− δp2 < 1.
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Observe that if s1 = s2 along the equilibrium it follows that
Uδ,p(hs,s) =
1− δp2
p2
∑
t>0
p2t+2δtu(at, at) 6 R.
Lemma 15. It follows that
Nδ,p(s, s
∗) 6 N eδ,p(s, s
∗) + 2
1− p2
p2(1− δ)M ;
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗) 6 N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗) + 2
1− p2
p2(1− δ)M ;
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) 6 Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) + 3
1− p2
p2(1− δ)M.
The next definition is an extension of the definition of subgame perfect strategies.
Definition 11. We say that s is a uniformly strict sub game perfect if for any s∗ follows that given
h ∈ Rs,s∗ then
(1− p2δ)C0 < Uδ,p(hs,s/hk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hk), (42)
for p > p0, δ > δ0 where C0, δ0, p0 are positive constants that only depend on T,R, P, S.
Given δ we take p such that it is verified,
3
1− p2
p2(1− δ)
M
C0(1− p2δ) < 1. (43)
Since p < 1 follows that 1− p2δ < 1− δ and taking p > 12 then to satisfies (43) we require that
3
4
1− p2
(1− δ)2
M
C0
< 1. (44)
Therefore, we take
p1(δ) =
√
1− 4
3
C0
M
(1− δ)2
and observe that it is a function smaller than 1 for δ < 1. Then, we define
p(δ) = max{1
2
, p1(δ),
√
δ} (45)
Lemma 16. If s∗ is strict subgame perfect and p > p(δ) (giving by equality 45) then
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6
N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)
+ 1;
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)
+ 1.
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Proof. It follows from lemma 15, s is a subgame perfect and that inequality (43) is satisfied
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
6
N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗) + 2 1−p
2
p2(1−δ)M
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)(1 + 2 1−p
2
p2(1−δ)M
1
Neδp(s,s
∗))
6
N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)(1 + 2M 1−p
2
(1−δ)p2C0(1−p2δ)
)
+ 2M
1− p2
(1− δ)p2C0(1− p2δ) ) 6
N¯ eδ,p(s, s
∗)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)
+ 1.
In a similar way it is done the estimate for
Bδ,p(s,s
∗,s′)
Nδ,p(s,s∗)
.
Now we will try to estimate
Uδ,p(s,s)−Uδ,p(s,s
∗)
Uδ,p(s,s)−Uδ,p(s∗,s)
based on lemma 16.
Lemma 17. If p > p(δ) (giving by equality 45) and s is a uniform strict and there exists D such
that for any h ∈ R∗s,s∗ holds
Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs,s∗/hkhˆk)
Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hkhˆk)
< D
then
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, s∗)
Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s∗, s) < D + 1.
Proof. It is enough to estimate
N¯δ,p(s,s
∗)
Nδ,p(s,s∗)
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
=∑
h∈Rs,s∗δ,p
δkps,s(hk)(Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs,s∗/hkhˆk))∑
h∈Rs,s∗ ,δ,p
δkps,s(hk)(Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hkhˆk))
=
∑
k,hk
δkps,s(hk)
Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk
)−Uδ,p(hs,s∗/hkhˆk
)
Uδ,p(s,s/hkhˆk)−Uδ,p(s∗,s/hkhˆk)
(Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs,s∗/hkhˆk)∑
k,hk
δkps,s(hk)(Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hkhˆk)
) 6
D
∑
h∈Rs,s∗δ,p
δkps,s(hk)(Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hkhˆk))∑
h∈Rs,s∗ ,δ,p
δkps,s(hk)(Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs∗,s/hkhˆk))
= D.
9 Existence of strategies with a uniformly large basin of attraction
In the present section we show that strategies like win-stay-lose-shift satisfy the conditions intro-
duced in subsection 7.1.
Definition 12. win-stay-lose-shift Let us define the strategy known as win-stay-lose-shift: f it
gets either T or R stays, if not, shifts. From now on, we denote win-stay lose-shift as w.
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For win-stay-lose-shift to be a subgame perfect strategy it is required that 2R > T + P (see
[NS] and [RC]). The next lemma is obvious but we state it since is fundamental to do a series of
calculations related to w.
Lemma 18. Given a finite path ht it follows that w is a symmetric strategy, meaning that
w(ht) = w(hˆt).
Proof. It follows from the fact that
w(C,D) = w(D,C) = D.
Theorem 12. If 2R > T + P then w has a uniformly large basin.
First we prove that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect (this is done in subsection 9.0.1), and
later we show that w satisfies the “Asymptotic bounded condition”. For the latter we need to bound
N¯δ,p(s, s
∗)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
(46)
and
B¯δ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
Nδ,p(s, s∗)
(47)
this is done in subsection 9.0.2 and 9.0.3, respectively.
9.0.1 w is a uniformly strict subgame perfect.
Given hk we have to estimate
Uδ,p(hw,w/hk)− Uδ,p(hs,w/hk)
where hw,w/hk is the equilibrium path for w,w starting with hk and hs,w/hk is the equilibrium path
for s,w starting with hk.
In what follows, to avoid notation, with U(., .) we denote Uδ,p(h.,./hk). Following that, we take
b1 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,w/hk)=R
p2j+2δj , b2 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,w/hk)=S
p2j+2δj ,
b3 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,w/hk)=T
p2j+2δj , b4 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,w/hk)=P
p2j+2δj .
Observe that
b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1
and
U(s,w) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P.
From the property of w, for each T that s can get (s plays D and w plays C) follows that in the
next move s may get either S or P because w plays D, so,
b2 + b4 > p
2δb3. (48)
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To calculate U(w,w) we have to consider either s(hk) = C, w(hk) = D or s(hk) = D, w(hk) = C.
So, from lemma 18
U(w,w) =
{
R if w(hk) = C
1−p2δ
p2
P + p2δR if w(hk) = D
To calculate U(s,w) in case that s(hk) = D,w(hk) = C, writing R = b1R + b2R + b3R + b4R by
inequality (48) it follows that
U(w,w) − U(s,w) = b2(R− S) + b3(R− T ) + b4(R− P )
> (b2 + b4)(R− P ) + b3(R − T )
> δp2b3(R− P ) + b3(R− T )
> b3[(1 + p
2δ)R − (T + P )].
Observing that if s(hk) = D,w(hk) = C, then
b3 > 1− p2δ
and since 2R − (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ and p large (meaning that they are close to one),
then [(1 + p2δ)R − (T + P )] > C0 for a positive constant smaller than 2R− (T + P ) and therefore
(provided that δ and p large are large) follows that
U(w,w) − U(s,w) > (1− p2δ)C0,
concluding that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect in this case.
In the case that s(hk) = C,w(hk) = D, observe that b2 > 1 − δ and calculating again the
quantities b1, b2, b3, b4 but starting from j > 1 then we get that
U(s,w) = (1− p2δ)S + p2δ[b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P ].
Therefore, writing p2δR = p2δ[b1R+ b2R+ b3R+ b4R] and arguing as before,
U(w,w) − U(s,w) = (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δ[b2(R − S) + b3(R− T ) + b4(R − P )]
> (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δ[(b2 + b4)(R − P ) + b3(R− T )]
> (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δ[δb3(R − P ) + b3(R − T )]
> (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δb3[(1 + δ)R − (T + P )]
since 2R − (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ large (b3 now can be zero)
U(w,w) − U(s,w) > (1− p2δ)(P − S),
proving that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect in this case.
Remark 15. Given ǫ small follows that for δ large then C0 can be estimated as
C0 = min{P − S, 2R − (T + S)− ǫ}. (49)
Remark 16. To prove that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect, the main two properties of w
used are
(i) it cooperates after seeing cooperation and so U(w,w) = R after w(hk) = C,
(ii) after getting P it goes back to cooperate, so U(w,w) = (1− δp2)P + δp2R after w(hk) = D,
(iii) it punishes after getting S,
(iv) 2R > T + P .
Observe, that the previous calculation does not use that w keeps defecting after obtaining T.
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9.0.2 Bounding (46).
First we estimate Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s,w) and Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(w, s). Recall that from lemma 17 it
follows that is enough to bound for any h ∈ R∗w,s :
Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,s/hkhˆk)
Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs,w/hkhˆk)
.
Calculating numerator and denominator.
For the moment, to avoid notation, we denote
U(s, s′) := Uδ,p(hs,s′/hkhˆh) = Uδ,p(hs,s′/hk) + U(hs,s′/hˆk).
Observe that if U(w,w) − U(s,w) = B2(R− S) +B3(R− T ) +B4(R− P ), then
U(w,w) − U(w, s) = B2(R− T ) +B3(R − S) +B4(R − P ).
To avoid notation, let us denote L = U(w,w)−U(s,w) = B2(R−S) +B3(R− T ) +B4(R−P ) so,
B4(R − P ) = L− [B2(R− S) +B3(R− T )] and therefore
U(w,w) − U(w, s) = B2(R− T ) +B3(R− S) + L− [B2(R− S) +B3(R− T )]
= L+B2(S − T ) +B3(T − S)
= L+ (B3 −B2)(T − S)
6 L+B3(T − S)
recalling that in case that b3 6= 0 then L = U(w,w)− U(s,w) > B3[(1 + δ)R− (T + P )] (if B3 = 0
then U(w,w)−U(w,s)U(w,w)−U(s,w) 6 1) it follows that
U(w,w) − U(w, s)
U(w,w) − U(s,w) 6
L+B3(T − S)
L
6 1 +
B3(T − S)
B3[(1 + δ)R − (T + P )]
= 1 +
T − S
(1 + δ)R − (T + P ) .
Therefore,
Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,s/hkhˆk)
Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk)− Uδ,p(hs,w/hkhˆk)
6 1 +
T − S
(1 + δ)R − (T + P ) , (50)
so by lemma 17
Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(w, s)
Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s,w) 6 2 +
T − S
(1 + δ)R − (T + P ) .
Remark 17. The main property of w used to bound (46) is that if b3 6= 0 then
U(w,w) − U(s,w) > b3[(1 + δ)R − (T + P )]
and this follows from the properties listed in remark 16.
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9.0.3 Bounding (47)
By lemma 16 we need to bound
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
N eδ,p(s, s
∗)
.
Recall that
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) =
∑
h:k(s,s′,s∗)
δkpss(hk)[Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hk hˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(hs,s/hkhˆk)].
For the particular case of s = w we divide the paths in two types: either w(hk) = C or w(hk) = D.
In the first case we claim that
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkhˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6 0.
Observe that Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) = 2R and by lemma 7 follows the assertion above. Therefore,
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) 6
∑
h:k(s,s′,s∗),w(hk)=D
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkhˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk).
In case that w(hk) = D observe that U(hw,w/hkhˆk) = 2
1−p2δ
p2 P + 2Rδ. To deal with this situation
we consider two cases: i) s′(hk) = C or s
′(hˆk) = C, and ii) s
∗(hk) = C or s
∗(hˆk) = C. So,
Beδ,p(s, s
∗, s′) 6
∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkhˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uhδ,p(w,w/hkhˆk) +
∑
h:s∗(hk)=C ors∗(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkhˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk).
Case i) s′(hk) = C or s
′(hˆk) = C: In this situation follows that h ∈ R∗(s′, w). We rewrite∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hkhˆk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hkhˆk)− 2Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) =
∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) +
∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk).
Using that h ∈ R∗(s′, w), and again lemma 7 then∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6
1− p2δ
p2
∑
h:h∈R∗(s′,w)
pws′(hk)δ
k[S + T − 2P ]
and ∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6
1− p2δ
p2
∑
h:h∈R∗(s′,w)
pws′(hk)δ
k[S + T − 2P ]
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but since
Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s′, w) > 1− p
2δ
p2
∑
h:h∈R∗(s′,w)
pws′(hk)δ
k[2P − (S + P )]
follows that∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6 Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s
′, w)
∑
h:s′(hk)=C ors′(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6 Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s
′, w).
Case ii) s∗(hk) = C or s
∗(hˆk) = C: In this situation follows that h ∈ R∗(s∗, w), and using this
key statement we conclude in a similar way that∑
h:s∗(hk)=C ors∗(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6
6 Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s∗, w)∑
h:s∗(hk)=C ors∗(hˆk)=C
Uδ,p(hs∗,s′/hk) + Uδ,p(hs′,s∗/hˆk)− Uδ,p(hw,w/hkhˆk) 6
6 Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s∗, w).
Therefore, recalling that
Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s∗, w) > Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s′, w)
we conclude that
Bδ,p(s, s
∗, s′)
Uδ,p(w,w) − Uδ,p(s∗, w)
is uniformly bounded and therefore bounding (47).
9.1 Generalized w for any payoff system
Recall that w has uniformly large basin, provided that 2R > S + T . Now, we consider w−type
strategies that have a uniformly large basin for any payoff system.
Definition 13. n-win-stay-lose-shift n−win-stay lose-shift. If it gets either T or R stays; if it
gets S, shifts to D and stays for n−period and then acts as w. We denote it with wn.
Theorem 13. For any payoff set there exists n such that wn is has a uniformly large basin.
Proof. The proof follows the same steps that we used to prove that w has a uniformly large basin
of attraction when 2R − (T + P ) > 0 but using the fact that for any payoff matrix there exists n
such that
nR > T + (n− 1)P.
To show that wn has a uniformly large basin of attraction, we calculate the quantities b1, b2, b3, b4
for u(s,wn) as it was done for w in subsection 9.0.1. In addition, observe that for wn it follows that
b2 + b4 > δp
2 1− (δp2)n
1− δp2 b3
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and if n is large enough then 1−(δp
2)n
1−δp2 > n− 1 and therefore,
b2 + b4 > (n− 1)b3.
Repeating the same calculation done for w, in case wn(hk) = C, s(hk) = D follows that
U(wn, wn)− U(s,wn) > (n− 1)b3(R − P ) + b3(R − T ) > (1− δp2)[nR− T − (n− 1)P ].
In case wn(hk) = D, s(hk) = C, the calculation is similar.
To bound uniformly the quantities (46) and (47) for wn, we proceed in a same way that was
done for w and it is only changed the upper bound 2R − (T + S) by nR− T − (n− 1)P .
9.2 Examples of strategies with low frequency of cooperation which have large
basin but they do not have uniformly large basin
In what follows, we give examples of strategies with arbitrary low frequency of cooperation which
have large basins (with size depending on δ and p), however, those strategies do not have uniformly
large basin of attraction. In other words, the lower bounds of their basin shrinks to zero when
δ, p → 0. More precisely, they can not have uniformly large basin due to theorem 5. Those
strategies are built combining w with a. Moreover, we establish some relation between the frequency
of cooperation and the lower bounds of the size of their local basin (but depending on δ and p).
Definition 14. We take n large and b0 < 1, we define the strategy aw
n,b0 as the strategy that in
blocks of times I lw = [l(n + m0n), l(n + m0n) + n − 1] behaves as w and in the blocks of times
I la = [l(n +m0n) + n, (l + 1)(n +m0n)− 1] behaves as a, where m0 denotes the integer part of 1b0
and l is a non-negative integer.
Theorem 14. For any n large, and any positive b0 the strategy aw
n,b0 has a large basin of attraction,
but not a uniformly large basin of attraction.
Proof. From now on, and to avoid notation, we denote awn,d0 with aw. First we are going to prove
that aw is a strict sub game perfect.
The strategy aw is a uniform strict subgame perfect: The proof is similar to the one performed
for w. Let s be another strategy and given a path h let k be the first deviation (s(hh) 6= aw(hk)).
Either k ∈ I lw or k ∈ I la] for some non-negative l. It follows that
Uδ,p(haw,aw/hk) = b0R+ (1− b0)P
where
b0 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j>0:uj(aw,aw/hk)=R
=
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j>0,Ilw
. (51)
Observe that provided δ large, then b0 is close to d0. Now we take s and assuming that it differs
in hk and aw(hk) = R, s(hk) = D. In what follows, to avoid notation, with U(., .) we denote
Uδ,p,h.,.(., ./hk). Following that, we take
b1 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,aw/hk)=R
p2j+2δj , b2 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,aw/hk)=S
p2j+2δj ,
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b3 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,aw/hk)=T
p2j+2δj , b4 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j:uj(s,aw/hk)=P
p2j+2δj .
Observe that
b1 + b2 + b3 + b4 = 1
and
U(s,w) = b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P.
Moreover, since in blocks I la aw behaves as a then
b4 > 1− b0 (52)
From the property that aw behaves as w in blocks of the form [l(n+m0n), (l + 1)(n +m0n) + n],
for each T that s can get on those blocks (s plays D and w plays C) follows that in the next move
s may get either S or P because w plays D, so, noting
bw4 =
1− p2δ
p2
∑
j∈Ilw:u
j(s,w/hk)=P
p2j+2δj
then
b4 > 1− b0 + bwu (53)
b2 + b
w
4 > p
2δb3. (54)
Writing
U(aw, aw) = b0R+ (1− b0)P = [b0 − (1− b4)]R + b1R+ b2R+ b3R+ (1− b0)R
by inequalities (52, 53, 54) it follows that
U(aw, aw) − U(s, aw) = [b0 − (1− b4)]R + b2(R− S) + b3(R− T ) + (1− b0 − b4)(R − P )
> (b0 + b4 − 1 + b2)(R − P ) + b3(R− T )
> (bw4 + b2)(R − P ) + b3(R− T )
> δp2b3(R − P ) + b3(R − T )
> b3[(1 + p
2δ)R − (T + P )].
Observing that if s(hk) = D, aw(hk) = C, then
b3 > 1− p2δ
and since 2R − (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ and p large (meaning that they are close to one),
then [(1 + p2δ)R − (T + P )] > C0 for a positive constant smaller than 2R− (T + P ) and therefore
(provided that δ and p large are large) follows that
U(aw, aw) − U(s, aw) > (1− p2δ)C0,
concluding that w is a uniform strict subgame perfect in the case aw(hk) = C, s(hk) = D.
In the case that s(hk) = C, aw(hk) = D so we know that
U(aw, aw) =
1− p2δ
p2
P + p2δ[b0R+ (1− b0)P ]
45
where b0 is calculated as in (51), but starting from j = 1. Calculating again the quantities b1, b2, b3, b4
but starting from j > 1 then we get that
U(s, aw) = (1− p2δ)S + p2δ[b1R+ b2S + b3T + b4P ].
Therefore, writing
p2δ[b0R+ (1− b0)P ] = p2δ[b0 − (1− b4)]R + b1R+ b2R+ b3R+ (1− b0)R]
and observing that also holds inequalities (52, 53, 54) and arguing as before it follows that
U(aw, aw) − U(s, aw) > (1− p2δ)(P − S) + δb3[(1 + δ)R − (T + P )]
since 2R − (T + P ) > 0 it follows that for δ large (b3 now can be zero)
U(aw, aw) − U(s, aw) > (1− p2δ)(P − S),
proving that aw is a uniform strict subgame perfect in the case aw(hk) = D, s(hk) = C.
The strategy aw verifies the asymptotic bounded condition, but depending on δp2: Bounding (46)
and (47) for aw: To bound Uδ,p(s, s)− Uδ,p(s, aw) we repeat the argument done for w and observe
that the key point is that U(aw, aw/hk) − U(s, aw/hk) > b3((1 + δ)R − (T + S)) which has been
proved when is proved that aw is a uniform strict subgame perfect.
To bound (47) we perform the same approach for w, however the estimates changes depending
on d0. More precisely, given s
′ and s∗ follows that
B(s′, s∗, aw) 6 2(1 − d0)(R − P ),
therefore, arguing as in the case of w follows that
Bδ,p(s
′, s∗, aw)
Nδ,p(aw, s∗)
6
2(1 − d0)(R − P )
(1− p2δ)(P − S) .
The strategy aw does not a uniformly large basin of attraction: It follows from the fact that aw
is symmetric but no efficient.
10 Perturbed Replicator Dynamics
We consider more general equations than the replicator dynamics with the restrictions that indi-
viduals with low scores die off and the ones with high ones flourish. More precisely, given a payoff
matrix A we consider equations defined in the usual n−dimensional simplex ∑, of the form
x˙i = xiGi(x)
such that
Gi(x) > 0, if and only if (Ax)i − xtAx > 0
Gi(x) < 0, if and only if (Ax)i − xtAx < 0.
In this case, it follows that
Gi(x) = [(Ax)i − xtAx]Hi(x) (55)
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where Hi :
∑ → R. Moreover, form previous assumption it holds that Hi is always positive in the
simplex
∑
. We require a slightly strong condition: C+ = max{Hi(x), x ∈
∑
, i = 1 . . . m} < +∞,
and C− = min{Hi(x), x ∈
∑
, i = 1 . . . m} > 0.
Then
0 < C− 6 Hi < C
+. (56)
The goal is to show that a version of theorem 1 can be obtained in the present case. More precisely,
provided the hypothesis of theorem 1 and assuming equations as above, it is shown that
∆ 1
M0
∩∆ C−
2C+
is contained in the local basin of attraction of e1. The proof, goes through the same strategy: we
shows that for any k 6 min{ 1M0 , C
−
2C+
}, re-writing the equations in affine coordinates follows that
∑
i>2
xiGi =
∑
i>2
xiFiHi < 0
where Fi is (Ax)i − xtAx in affine coordinates. From inequalities (56) it follows that
xiFi(x)Hi(x) < C
+xiFi(x), if Fi(x) > 0; xiFi(x)Hi(x) < C
−xiFi(x), if Fi(x) < 0.
Recalling that Fj(x) = (fj − f1)(x) +R(x) with R(x) =
∑
l(f1 − fl)(x)xl (the variable x is already
assumed in affine coordinates) follows that∑
i
xiFi(x)Hi(x) 6
∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
C+xiFi(x) +
∑
{i:Fi(x)<0}
C−xiFi(x)
=
∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
xiC
+(fi − f1)(x) +
∑
{i:Fi(x)<0}
xiC
−(fi − f1)(x)
+ R(x)[
∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
C+xi +
∑
{i:Fi(x)<0}
C−xi].
If x ∈ ∆k with k < C−2C+ it follows that
∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
C+xi +
∑
{i:Fi(x)<0}
C−xi] 6
C−
2 and recalling
the definition of R0 follows that∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
xiC
+(fi − f1)(x) +
∑
{i:Fi(x)<0}
xiC
−(fi − f1) +R(x)[
∑
C+xi +
∑
C−xi] 6
∑
{i:Fi(x)>0}
xiCˆ
+(fi − f1)(x) +
∑
{i:Fi(x)<0}
xiCˆ
−(fi − f1)
where Cˆ+ = C+ − C−2 , Cˆ− = C
−
2 . Therefore, rewriting the equation as it was done in the proof of
theorem 1 to finish we have to prove that
N(cx) + xtM(cx) < 0 (57)
where cx = (c1x1, c2x2, . . . , cnxn) and ci is either Cˆ
+ or Cˆ− and N,M are the vector and matrix
induce by A and so. To prove (57), we need a more general version of lemma 10. The proofs are
similar.
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Lemma 19. Let c = (c1, . . . , cm) ∈ Rm such that each coordinate is positive. Let Qc : Rm → R
given by
Q(x) = N(cx) + xtM(cx)
with x ∈ Rm, N ∈ Rm, M ∈ Rm×m and cx := (c1x1, . . . , cmxm). Let us assume that Ni < 0 for any
i and for any j > i, |Ni| > |Nj |. Let
M0 = max
i, j>i
{Mij +Mji−Ni , 0}.
Then, the set ∆ 1
M0
= {x ∈ Rm : xi > 0,
∑m
i=1 xi <
1
M0
}, is contained in {x : Qc(x) < 0}. In
particular, if M0 = 0 then
1
M0
is treated as ∞ and this means that {x ∈ Rm : xi > 0} ⊂ {x :
Qc(x) 6 0}.
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